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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF EU EXTERNAL POLICY MAKING IN JUSTICE 
AND HOME AFFAIRS: THE CASE OF THE EU-TURKEY READMISSION-VISA 
AGREEMENT  
 
Alper Baysan 
Political Science, M.A. Thesis, 2013  
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Bac 
 
Key Words: EU External Affairs, Justice and Home Affairs, Readmission-Visa 
Agreements, Turkey-EU Relations 
 
Between 2009 and 2010, five Western Balkan countries were granted Schengen visa 
exemptions by the EU. Turkey, by contrast, was only offered a vague promise for the 
initiation of a visa liberalization “dialogue” in return for initialing an analogous 
readmission agreement in 2012. Taking this outcome as a genuine research puzzle, the 
present thesis embarks upon two interrelated questions: why has the EU withheld from 
Turkey a genuine visa liberalization perspective? And more generally, what domestic 
dynamics drive EU external affairs policy-making in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in 
areas such as immigration, visa and border policy? 
This study puts forward a domestic politics centered explanation (couched in liberal 
intergovernmentalist theory) to the puzzle at hand. In particular, it is argued that the 
reason for the differential visa agreement outcome in the Turkish case, as compared to 
the Balkans, emanated from opposition by key member state governments (Germany, 
France, Austria and the Netherlands) and was driven by adverse domestic sentiments. 
Public sentiments and not economic interest group pressure (standard liberal 
intergovernmentalist account) have shaped governmental preferences in these countries 
because of the securitization (causal mechanisms) of the Turkish visa issue. The 
argument is assessed controlling for supranational institutionalist rival explanations. 
At the theoretical level, the findings buttress an important point in the literature about 
the issue-specific nature of domestic preferences. A general theoretical proposition 
advanced here is that domestic sentiments trump economic interests in the 
governmental preference formation process in JHA policies where the issue at hand is 
securitized. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
AB ADALET VE İÇ İLİŞKİLER ALANINDA DIŞ POLİTİKA OLUŞTURMA 
SÜRECİNDE ÜLKE İÇ POLİTİKALARIN ROLÜ: AB-TÜRKİYE GERİKABUL-
VİZE ANTLAŞMASI KONUSU 
 
Alper Baysan 
Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tezli, 2013 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: AB Dış İlişkileri, Adalet ve İç İlişkiler Politikaları, Gerikabul-Vize 
Antlaşmaları, AB-Türkiye İlişkileri 
 
2009-2010 yılları arasında beş Batı Balkan ülkesi Gerikabul Antlaşması imzalamaları 
üzerine Avrupa Birliği tarafından Şchengen vizesinden muaf tutulmuşlardır. Buna 
karşılık Türkiye 2012 yılındaki Gerikabul Antlaşması’nı başlatması karşılığında vize 
gerekliliğinden muaf tutulacağına dair sadece muğlak bir söz alabilmiştir. Bunu temel 
mihenk noktası kabul ederek bu çalışma birbiriyle ilişkili iki soruyu ele almaktadır: 
Avrupa Birliği neden Türkiye’ye fazıl vize muafiyeti perspektifi tanımamıştır? Dahası, 
hangi ulusal dinamikler AB’nin Adalet ve İç İşleri politikasını göç vize ve sınır 
politikası gibi alanlarda yürütüyor? 
Bu çalışma devlet tercihi odaklı bir açıklama ile bu soruna devletler-arası liberal teorisi 
ile açıklık getirmeye çalışıyor. Türkiye’nin Balkan devletleri gibi vize muafiyetine ortak 
edilmemesi AB’nin yetkili ülkeleri (Almanya, Fransa, Avusturya ve Hollanda gibi) 
tarafından kabul edilmemesi ve bu da malum devletlerin içerisinde yer alan olumsuz iç 
duyarlılıktan kaynaklandığı öne sürmektedir. Halkın duyarlılığı ve ekonomik olmayan 
grupların baskısı Türkiye’nin vize konusunu güvenlikleştirmesi nedeniyle bu 
ülkelerdeki hükümetlerin tercihlerini şekillendirmiştir. Argüman ulus üstü kurumsal 
teorisinin sağladığı rakip açıklamalar ile kontrol edilerek değerlendirilmiştir. 
Teorik olarak, bu bulgular iç tercihlerin kendine özgü doğasındaki önemli noktalara 
dikkat çekiyor. Burada ileri sürülen genel teori güvenlikleştirilen Adalet ve İç İlişkiler 
politikalarında hükümetsel tercihlerin iç duyarlılığına göre (ekonomik çıkarlar değil) 
şekillendiğini gösteriyor. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Topic and Relevance of this Study 
 
The European Union, as primarily an international soft power, has developed a number 
of non-militaristic policy tools with which it influences its closer and wider 
neighborhood. One of these tools is the so-called readmission agreement. The 
agreement is concluded with third states and obliges them to repatriate and take back 
illegal and transmit migrants immigrating to EU territory from or via their soil. In many 
cases, readmission agreements also stipulate the implementation of reforms in the area 
of border and security policy, such as the introduction of biometric passports, or linking 
up of the country’s border policing database with the Schengen information system 
(SIS). These obligations are designed on a case-by-case basis in view of the 
requirements and needs of the specific country at hand. By and large, the main purpose 
behind readmission agreements is to promote the policing capabilities and thus security 
of the EU’s external border. 
In the last two decades, with immigration having come to be designated one of the most 
pressing contemporary problems the European community faces, readmission 
agreements have become a key policy tool for the EU in tackling the “problem” of 
illegal immigration. Because the agreements themselves implicate high adoption costs 
(undertake domestic reforms, take back illegal immigrants) for third states, the EU has 
introduced an incentive structure as a form of compensation. Since 2002, readmission 
agreements are systematically coupled with the conclusion of visa facilitation 
(facilitated visa application process) or visa liberalization deals (abolishment of travel 
restrictions). The EU thereby offers the incentive of lifting visa restrictions – a privilege 
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highly valued as it soothes access to the Schengen region comprising 26 European 
countries1, and by the same token to the European Union which achieves approximately 
40% of global trade, is the largest global exporter in both goods and services, and 
maintains a GDP roughly equal to the US comprising 25% or one quarter of total world 
GDP -  conditional upon third countries’ taking up of the contract’s obligations.  
Examining the coming about of EU readmission-visa agreements suggests itself as a 
promising research topic on two important empirical and theoretical grounds. First, 
policy-making dynamics in communitarized areas á la Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)2 
are characterized by the involvement of pro-integrative supranational actors in the 
policy process such as the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. 
This stands in stark contrast to domains such as Common Foreign Security Policy 
(CFSP), which is entirely intergovernmental in terms of its procedural rules and where 
member states usually have greater sway. What is more, the external dimension of JHA 
has become a highly dynamic policy domain in the last years. In 2011 alone, “no less 
than 26 out of a total of 136 texts adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
Council, that is 19.1 per cent, were related to agreements with third countries and other 
external dimension issues” (Monar 2013). Thus, JHA is a growing policy field and 
policy activities therein are likely to generate a host of new and interesting research 
questions for future studies. Second, understanding political outcomes in domains where 
the “co-decision” rule governs decision-making procedures embodies a tougher 
theoretical challenge to conventional intergovernmental theories of EU policy making 
which are considered baseline models in the EU integration literature. Insights derived 
from the study of communitarized areas can help revise theory and formulate novel 
hypotheses. As the EU is composed of a complex web of institutional rules (formal as 
well as informal) exhibiting substantial variation across policy areas (Tsebelis & Garret 
2001), developing middle-range theories is a vital task, simply because different 	  
1http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122348.pd
f (Accessed 30 May 2013) 
 
2 Note that with the Lisbon Treaty (2009) the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policy 
domain has been renamed as the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). For 
reasons of simplicity and to avoid confusion, the denotation JHA shall be used 
throughout this paper. The reason for this is that many EU documents still refer to the 
domain. What is more, the respective group of Ministers of Interior in the European 
Council also continues to be named the Justice and Home Affairs Council. 
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decision-making modalities are likely to have a differential impact on policy outcomes. 
This point becomes all the more important given that in JHA alone the variation in 
modes of governances is significant (Monar 2011). That being said, let us now turn to 
introducing the empirical puzzle taken up in this study and then turn to formulate 
research questions that are to guide the subsequent inquiry. 
 
1.2. Empirical Puzzle and Research Questions 
 
Between 2009 and 2010, five Western Balkan countries (Serbia, Montenegro and 
Macedonia in 2009 followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania in 2010) have 
achieved abolishing short-term travel Schengen visa requirements in return for signing 
readmission agreements with the European Union. At the time of conclusion, none of 
these countries had started membership accession negotiations. This stands in stark 
contrast to Turkey who was already five years into the accession process in 2010. Other 
non-candidate countries in the EU’s closer neighbourhood such as Georgia, Russia, the 
Ukraine and Armenia were granted visa-facilitation arrangements for signing analogous 
agreements. 
Negotiations on the EU-Turkey readmission-visa agreement, by contrast, have been 
lengthy and cumbersome and not culminated in a visa facilitation or visa liberalization 
deal. Formally opened in 2005, talks with the EU’s most longstanding membership 
candidate exhibited only very slow progress. As late as February 2011, six years into 
the readmission agreement negotiations, both sides achieved settlement upon a draft 
text. One year later, in June 2012, Turkey and the European Commission, who was 
thereto given a negotiation mandate by the Council, finally initialled the agreement. 
Under the agreed draft, Turkey takes up, first, the obligation to repatriate Turkish 
nationals found to reside in the EU without a residence permit or visa, and second, 
third-country nationals (transit migrants) that have entered the EU via Turkish soil - this 
regulation, though, will come into force only after a three-year transition period.  
The agreed EU-Turkey readmission-visa agreement bears a crucial difference to that of 
the Balkan cases, though: Turkey has not been given a guarantee of visa-liberalization 
in return for taking up the obligations of the readmission agreement. The agreed text 
merely states that the EU will “take steps towards visa liberalisation as a gradual and 
long term perspective” (European Council 2012). This stipulation impresses an open-
ended nature upon Turkey’s visa process – a clause very reminiscent of the country’s 
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EU membership prospect in general. In the cases of the Western Balkans, by contrast, 
the promise for abolishing visa requirements had been expressly and clearly made early 
on in the process. Further, Turkey’s bid for visa-liberalization is unlikely to be a safe 
bet because the successful conclusion of the process will be contingent not only upon 
Turkey’s meeting of all requirements but, more importantly, upon obtaining European 
Council approval (that is to say, member state consent). Given that much of the 
complications in the Turkish case emanated from member state opposition, obtaining 
Council approval will surely not be an easy task. 
Thus, the empirical puzzle lies in the EU’s differential treatment of Turkey on the visa 
issue compared to the EU’s dealings with other countries in the Balkans. The puzzle, in 
turn, points at two interrelated questions that this thesis sets to address: first, why has 
the EU withheld a genuine visa-liberalization prospect from Turkey? It is important to 
note that this question is part of a broader one which pertains to the modalities of policy 
making in EU external affairs in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The second, thus 
more theoretical question embarked upon herein reads: what are the domestic dynamics 
driving EU external policy making JHA immigration, visa and border policies? The 
main traits of the argument advanced herein are presented below. 
 
1.3. The Argument 
 
The present study puts forward a state preferences centered explanation for the 
differential visa agreement outcome in the Turkey-EU case, one that is couched in 
liberal intergovernmentalist theory. The argument is tested controlling for supranational 
institutionalist rival explanations along the way. 
In particular, it is argued that the differential outcome in the Turkey-EU readmission-
visa case emanated from key member state opposition (most importantly Germany and 
France, in concert with Austria and the Netherlands) which was largely driven by 
adverse domestic sentiments. The reason why public opinion and not economic interest 
group pressure (standard liberal intergovernmentalist account) shaped member state 
preferences resides in the fact that the Turkish visa issue has been securitized in these 
countries. Securitization thereby worked as triggering causal mechanism insofar as it 
moved Turkish visa liberalization from the realm of low politics (economic and social 
issue) into high politics (national security and survival issue), in consequence of which, 
political elites attended to their publics’ sentiments.  
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The argument is assessed by way of four comparative case studies on Germany, 
Austria, the Netherlands (opposed Turkey’s visa bid) as well as Italy (supported 
Turkey’s visa bid). These cases were selected on the grounds that they embody 
variation on both the independent (public opinion on travel easement for non-EU 
nationals) and dependent variable (preference on Turkey’s visa bid). 
On a more general level, the results obtained herein buttress a crucial point raised in the 
literature: member state preferences are best conceived of as issue-specific. Following 
this thread of argument, a basic theoretical proposition advanced herein with a view on 
policy-making dynamics in the realm of JHA policies reads: public sentiments trump 
economic interests as a source of governmental preference formation in JHA policies 
such as immigration, border and visa policy where the issue at hand is securitized.3 
 
1.4. Research Design 
 
Since the empirical puzzle that motivates this research is the differential Turkey-EU 
readmission-visa agreement outcome, the overall design of this thesis can be described 
as deviant case study (George & Bennett 2005, 31). In essence, there are two central 
objectives with deviant research designs: (1) explaining why the particular case at hand 
diverged from standard expectations, and (2) in the process thereof, revisiting extant 
theory with a view towards generating novel theoretical propositions (Levy 2008, 13). 
This double-sided research purpose – the explanation of a particular outcome and 
refining of theory – denotes a practice that is fairly common in the social sciences 
(Bennett & Braumoeller 2010). To be sure, though, the mode of generalization hereby 
targeted is theory-related and analytical, not statistical (Yin 1994). That is to say, the 
findings serve as the basis for abstract theoretical propositions and not generalizations 
on populations as is done in statistical research.  
Whilst the general focus in this thesis will indeed be on a particular case (Turkey-EU 
visa readmission agreement), the analysis will not be conducted in a completely 
insulated manner. Rather, it will be embedded within its broader context with a view on 
the readmission-visa agreements the EU has signed with other countries. The rationale 	  
3 To be sure, given the qualitative design of the study the objective here is primarily to 
derive theoretical abstractions, not statistical generalizations. Future research should 
follow up the matter towards deriving statements about the argument’s veracity across 
cases. 
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for doing so is grounded in an important inferential consideration: “the strongest means 
of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of within-case 
analysis and cross-case comparisons” (George & Bennett 2005, 18).4 
In terms of methodology, two methods form the backbone of this thesis: process-
tracing and congruence testing. Process tracing entails tracing the political ‘decision 
process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes’ (George and 
McKeown, 1985). The researcher thereby investigates the ‘unfolding of events or 
situations over time’ (Collier 2011, 824). Process tracing has come to be regarded as a 
viable tool in qualitative research (Brady and Collier 2012) as it allows for (i) the 
multiplication of within-case observations and (ii) helps lay bare the specific causal 
mechanisms at work (that is to say, the link between a hypothesized relationships 
amongst variable X and Y). Applying the congruence method implicates deriving 
precise empirical implications that follow from one’s hypotheses. The predictions 
embodied therein are then compared to the empirical patterns as actually observed in the 
real-world (Yin 1994, 116). These implications or predictions can denote what, how, 
and when something should happen if the theories are to be valid (Blatter & Haverland 
2012). The task then lies in looking for “congruence or incongruity between expectation 
and observation” (Van Evera 1997, 56).  
In terms of data, this thesis draws upon a wide range of material from diverse sources. 
These include statistical databases and archives, newspaper accounts, political 
statements, protocols of parliamentary debates as well as personal interviews. 5 
Diversifying data sources in this manner comes closest to the idea of data triangulation 
(Denzin 1970) - a method which minimizes potential sources of bias and therewith 
helps strengthen the validity of one’s causal inferences. 
 
 
 	  
4 As Gerring has noted elsewhere, the employment of informal comparative designs 
(that is, where the comparison serves purposes of illustration and does not stand at the 
core of the research endeavor) is quite common practice in qualitative research (Gerring 
2004). 
 
5 Overall, both numerical and qualitative data will be drawn upon in this thesis in the 
spirit of multi-method research. 
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1.5. Outline of the Thesis 
 
The present thesis is organized as follows: having presented the research topic and 
design of this study, Chapter 2 moves on with laying out the conceptual basis for 
inquiry and surveying conventional theories in the literature on policy making in EU 
external affairs. Taking it from there, Chapter 3 maps out the theoretical framework 
which is couched in liberal intergovernmentalist theory. With chapter 4 the empirical 
analysis begins with an examination of the historical background of EC/EU and 
member state visa policy towards Turkey. Chapter 5 then proceeds with an analysis of 
contemporary EU visa policy vis-à-vis Turkey. Chapter 6 moves on with exploring the 
real-world implications of restrictive EU visa policy. It does so by looking at Schengen 
visa issuing practices vis-à-vis Turkish nationals. Chapter 7 wraps up the findings of the 
study and discusses empirical and theoretical implications. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
EU EXTERNAL AFFAIRS POLICY MAKING: THE CONVENTIONAL 
WISDOM 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Conceptualizing EU External Affairs 
 
The subject matter, which forms the empirical domain of this thesis, is EU external 
affairs policy making in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Before proceeding with the 
inquiry, the conceptual basis of what is hereinafter referred to as EU external affairs 
needs to be clarified. The main task will thereby lie in drawing out the differences to a 
closely related, yet inherently different policy domain: EU foreign policy. 
Scholars and practitioners alike have suggested various definitions for EU external 
affairs. For one, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan in their influential book entitled The 
Foreign Policy of the European Union (2008) suggested differentiating external affairs 
and foreign policy as separate policy domains. In their view, external affairs is about 
“maintaining relations with external actors”, whereas foreign policy “is directed at the 
external environment with the objective of influencing that environment and the 
behavior of other actors within it, in order to pursue interests, values and goals” 
(Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008, 19). Keukeleire and MacNaughtan thereby seem to 
build upon the EU’s own jargon which classifies issues such as trade, commercial and 
developmental policy as part of external affairs, whereas Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) as well as European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) are understood 
to belong to EU foreign policy.6  
While it may often indeed make sense to embrace definitions put forward by political 
actors, adopting the EU’s (or Keukeleire & MacNaughtan’s for that matter) conceptual 
scheme in this context appears problematic on both empirical and analytical grounds 
(Reh 2009). Most importantly, neither trade nor migration policy, which following 	  
6 See http://europa.eu/pol/ext/index_en.htm (Accessed 10 February 2013). 
 10  
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan would make up instances of EU external affairs, merely 
revolve around the sole objective of maintaining relations with external actors as the 
authors suggest. These and other policies in EU external affairs almost invariably 
implicate the pursuit of specific interests and goals, regardless of whether these are 
made explicit or not. Take, for instance, readmission agreements the EU concludes with 
third countries. These agreements, and this is quite openly declared, serve the goal of 
“fending off” illegal immigrants coming to the EU. So, contrary to Keuleleire and 
MacNaughtan’s supposition, external affairs policies can in fact serve specific interests. 
To carry the thought further, not only JHA policies but pretty much any external EU 
policy is laden with interest-driven behavior. The EU being primarily a soft-power does 
not prescribe its actions to follow the “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 
1989) across the board. 
Thus, a heuristically sound inquiry requires a conceptual basis that reflects the empirical 
realities of the policy process. Daniel Thomas, a leading scholar in the field, has 
suggested a viable definition in this regard. Following Thomas, EU external affairs and 
EU foreign policy are herein characterized as domains where policies adopted to 
address issues and manage relationships beyond the Union’s collective external border 
(Thomas 2011, 10; slightly changed). While the two policy domains, external affairs 
and foreign policy, are indeed underpinned by analogous goal-driven behavior, there yet 
remains a crucial qualitative difference between both that needs to be done justice. EU 
external affairs and EU foreign policy can be said to differ in terms of the (1) nature of 
issues, and the (2) decision-making rules involved. Table 1 illustrates. 
 
Table 1.  EU External Affairs vs. EU Foreign Policy: Conceptual Clarifications 
 EU External Affairs EU Foreign Policy 
Nature of Issues Low Politics 
(‘First Pillar’) 
High Politics 
(‘Second and Third Pillar’) 
 
 Decision-Making 
 
Community Method Intergovernmental Method 
Policy Areas Economic and Trade Policy, 
Enlargement, European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP), 
Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA)* 
Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), Common 
Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP),  
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The first criterion of distinction is the nature of issues involved and two types are 
distinguished here: low politics and high politics (Hoffmann 1966;  Keohane & Nye 
1977, 23; see also Allen 2012, 644). Low politics encompasses economic and social 
policy issues and revolves around welfare issues. High politics, by contrast, involves 
issues related to national sovereignty and security and touches upon the highly delicate 
matter of state survival. On the most general level, it can be said that EU foreign policy 
is mostly about high politics, whereas EU external affairs policies are best characterized 
as issues of low politics (ECFSP and CSDP embody ideal-types of high politics, whilst 
EU economic and trade policy are typical cases of low politics). 
While these classifications are rather straightforward, some EU external affairs policies 
may in certain national contexts be conceived of as high politics issues. One such case 
is the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) involving policies as immigration, border and 
visa policy. While these polices, technically speaking, revolve around the regulation of 
the cross-border movement of people – and as such, could be classified as low politics 
issues – their conceptualization (low or high politics) ultimately hinges upon the 
national context and the specifics of elite and public conceptions therein. Where a given 
JHA policy issue (e.g. visa policy) is constructed as a threat to state or society 
(securitization), it is moved from low politics into the realm of high politics. As a 
consequence, policy-making modalities alter. Individualist state preferences come to the 
fore and hard bargaining takes over the negotiation process. Political elites are wary of 
integrating policies in the EU which they conceive of as vital to the survival of the state 
(high politics). This is an important point to bear in mind and we will come back to it 
later on when laying out the theoretical framework of this study. 
A second criterion along which EU external affairs and EU foreign policy can be 
differentiated is decision-making patterns. Roughly speaking, we can distinguish two 
procedures: the intergovernmental method and the community method. 7  In the 
intergovernmental mode, member states preserve much of the control over the policy 
process by virtue of unanimity voting in the Council and restricted competencies for the 
Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice. In the community method, decision-
making is governed by the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision) where EU 	  
7 The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) stipulates decision-making rules. 
Notwithstanding the official abolishment of the pillar structure with the Lisbon Treaty 
(1 December 2009), the old pillar structure (e.g. community vs. intergovernmental 
method) has largely been retained. 
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institutions and member states (through the Council) share decision-making 
competencies. The intergovernmental method governs much of decision-making in EU 
foreign policy areas such as CFSP or ESDP, while the community method forms the 
main pattern of decision-making in issues in EU external affairs areas such as Economic 
and Trade Policy, ENP, and JHA. In a sense, these two decision making regimes can be 
said to reflect the low and high politics fault line as well. 
In sum, while the Lisbon Treaty (signed in 2007, coming into force 1 December 2009) 
has formally abolished the three-pillar structure, the treaty yet informally retained ‘the 
division between the policy-making regimes for CFSP/ESDP and the EU’s other 
external activities’ (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008, 62), as alluded to further above. 
It is for this empirical reason, first and foremost, that it is meaningful to conceptually 
differentitate EU external affairs from the EU foreign policy domain.8 
 
2.2. Conventional Approaches: Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist 
Theories 
  
Having rendered the conceptual basis for our subsequent inquiry, we may now turn to 
survey the literature on conventional theories of EU integration. What have common 
theories said (or would have said) on the subject of policy making in EU external 
affairs? Two classic approaches emerge in this respect: neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism. Let us consider each in turn. 
 
2.2.1. Neofunctionalism 
 
Neofunctionalism was the prevalent theory of regional integration in the 1950s and 60s 
and retained its dominance up until the 70s (Leuffen et al. 2012, 62). Prominent 
scholars in this research program include Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg, Joseph Nye and 
Philippe Schmitter defined and variously refined the neofunctionalist research agenda to 
the study of integration processes. For the latter reason in particular neofunctionalism’s 
core assumptions and key arguments cannot be easily re-stated in a authoritative 	  
8 Foreign policy, after all, is a domain that touches upon highly delicate matters such as 
national sovereignty and identity – the raison d’etre of states if one will - and is 
therefore likely to remain under member state control (Moravcsik 1998).  
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manner. The following explication will therefore primarily draw upon a synopsis put 
forward by two contemporary neofunctionalist scholars (Niemann & Schmitter 2009, 
45-50). 
First and foremost, neofunctionalist theory has been conceived of as a grand theory - a 
descriptive as well as explanatory model that is held to be valid across time and place. 
Secondly, the theory builds on the idea of integration as a process unfolding over time 
and developing its own self-reinforcing dynamics. This temporal perspective stands in 
stark contrast to intergovernmentalist analyses which, as will be explicated later, 
traditionally look at single observation points (e.g. EC/EU treaty negotiation 
situations.). Third and relatedly, neofunctionalism is based on a pluralist ontology as it 
posits integration to be characterized by the engagement of multiple actors, both 
supranational and domestic, whereby the yet most decisive role in advancing regional 
integration is ascribed to political elites. Finally, and herein lies the somewhat 
teleological element in neofunctionalist theory (as in Mitrany’s preceding 
functionalism), prominent scholars such as Haas have conjectured that with expanding 
regional integration a shift in actors’ expectations and loyalties toward a new regional 
center [Europe] would occur (Haas 1958, 16). While often only implicit, the flipside of 
the neofunctionalist argument projected the weakening of the nation-state as a 
consequence of supranationalization. 
The dynamism embodied in these assumptions is encapsulated in the concept of 
spillover – the logic through which neofunctionalists have sought to explain integration. 
Haas has described spillover as the ‘expansive logic of sector integration’ (1958, 383) 
whereby the integration of one policy (e.g. trade) leads to ‘technical’ pressure for 
integration in other sectors (e.g. Schengen and the freedom of movement). For instance, 
the benefits from intra-EU trade in the single market would be undermined if costly visa 
procedures and lengthy border controls had been in place. This is perhaps the most 
prominent mechanism identified by neofunctionalist scholars and, in view of the 
economic-functional rationale underpinning the process, has later come to be labeled 
functional spillover (Lindberg & Scheingold 1970). In addition to the functional 
mechanic of integration which, if one will, denotes a source of ‘bottom up’ pressure for 
integration, scholars such as Lindberg (1963) attributed a decisive role to political elites 
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and socialization effects (political spillover) as well.9 Lindberg, in particular, went at 
great lengths to draw attention to dense interactions between national officials in 
community institutions, working groups, and subcommittees. He expected these 
interaction patterns to increase the likelihood of socialization processes among national 
civil servants within the Council (Niemann & Schmitter 2009, 50), the result of which 
was expected to be not only a shift in elites expectations and loyalties, but also the 
coming about of ‘a cumulative pattern of accommodation in which the participants 
refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by 
means of compromises upgrading common interests’ (Haas 1958, 66). Another spillover 
mechanism identified by early neofunctionalist scholars, later termed cultivated 
spillover (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991), centers around the ‘cultivating’ role of 
community institutions and officials (‘Eurocrats’) vis-à-vis national authorities. In his 
early writings, Haas’ emphasis was on the Commission and its bureaucratic apparatus 
as a genuine mediator facilitating agreement on integrative outcomes among member 
states. Lindberg stressed the Commission’s role in the cultivation of ties with national 
authorities. Both authors concurred on the decisive role they ascribed to the 
Commission and supranational institutions, more generally, in the coming about of 
cooperative agreements (Niemann & Schmitter 2009, 50).  
That being said, how could one bring neofunctionalist theoretical insights to bear on EU 
external affairs policy making vis-à-vis third states? Theoretically speaking, it is quite 
conceivable for functional and political spillover mechanisms to bring about 
cooperative arrangements in the EU’s external affairs. In particular, if we think of visa 
agreements analyzed herein, it is possible that close political, economic or trade 
relations between EU member states and a given third country will eventually ‘spill 
over’ and create further cooperative arrangements (such as visa facilitation deals). This, 
one may readily argue, may have indeed been the case with states in the European 
neighborhood such as Georgia, Ukraine or Russia when the EU decided to enter into 
visa facilitation agreements with thems As known, visa facilitation eases the entry of 
third nationals to the Schengen area and has been demonstrated to be a particularly 
	  
9 Haas’ focus was broad (pluralistic) in that he conceived integration pressure to 
emanate not only from political elites, but from ‘business, and professional associations, 
trade unions, or other interest groups’ as well (Niemann & Schmitter 2009, 49).  
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important tool to boost economic and trade relations (through eased mobility for 
business purposes).  
Yet, a crucial problem with the neofunctionalist lens lies in the ascription of the 
spillover logic to a given outcome which, in retrospect, seems all too easily doable. The 
mechanism is hardly observable in a direct fashion which renders inference making 
often a rather ambiguous undertaking. Another important problem is that 
neofunctionalism remains overwhelmingly silent on the role of member states and their 
domestic preferences vis-à-vis the integration process. An easy illustration will help 
elucidate this point. For instance, is the European Commission able to enter into visa 
agreements with third countries without Council consent. No. The very basic decision-
making rules in the EU stipulate a key role to the Council, that is ultimately member 
states. These institutional realities, at the very least, point at the necessity of ‘bringing 
the state back’ into the analysis. These shortcomings with neofunctionalist theorizing 
lead us to the next theory in line, namely, intergovernmentalism (an approach which has  
been developed as a critique to neofunctionalism). 
 
2.2.2. Intergovernmentalism 
 
Intergovernmentalism was developed as a critique to neofunctionalism in view of the 
latter’s inability to explain regressive developments on the European continent in the 
mid-1960s. The most illustrative case is the ‘Empty Chair Crisis’ (1965), a boycott of 
EEC institutions instigated by then French President Charles De Gaulle in response to 
further competency transfers to the European Commission.10 The French nationalist 
turn in the 1960s under De Gaulle, above all, culminated in the conclusion of an 
informal agreement (‘Luxembourg Compromise’) which conceded important veto 
	  
10 In July 1965, De Gaulle had ordered his ministers to boycott European institutions 
because of an ‘all-too-bold’ Commission Proposal on agricultural policy that would 
have implicated, for French tastes, too much of a competency and autonomy transfer to 
the Commission. De Gaulle was known to be a fierce French nationalist eager to defend 
and uphold his idea of a universalist nationalism. He did so for almost six months and 
things returned to normal only after member states were able to agree upon the so-called 
‘Luxembourg Compromise’ – an informal agreement that conceded veto power to 
member states.  
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powers to member states in the Council.11 These and similar empirical developments in 
the 1960s were crucial in that they ran fundamentally counter hitherto neofunctionalist 
expectations and the idea of ‘spillover’. European Integration had not taken up its own 
self-reinforcing dynamics. Au contraire, the “masters of the treaty” (national 
governments) had stepped back to the fore. 
In the summer of 1966, following the French assertion, renown American social 
scientist Stanley Hoffmann published an impactful article entitled Obstinate or 
Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe. Influenced by 
extant realist thought, Hoffmann effectively laid the grounds for an IR couched 
intergovernemntalist integration theory by readjusting, if one, will, the lens on the most 
basic unit of analysis in international affairs: the nation-state.  
Hoffmann’s intergovernmentalist argument is constructed around three central domains: 
(1) international context, (2) national interest, and (3) issue-area (George and Bache 
2001, 12-13). First, in terms of international context, Hoffmann posited that regional 
integration could not be viewed devoid from its global context. That is, events and 
developments elsewhere in the international arena (e.g. crises, war etc.) were 
understood as potentially relevant external dynamics that could affect the pace and 
trajectory of regional integration – this externalist view stands in contrast to 
neofunctionalism’s internalist outlook (Hoffmann 1966, 167). Second, as regard 
national interest, Hoffmann argued that it is the domestic preferences of states that 
drives integration in the international arena. As he states: ‘Domestic differences and 
different world views obviously mean diverging foreign policies’ (Hoffmann 1966, 
166). Integration would thus only ‘go as far as governments were prepared to allow it to 
go’ (George and Bache 2001, 13), because statesmen’s main concern lies in protecting 
the national interest. At times, Hoffmann’s notion of national interest was understood to 
encompass all sorts of interests ranging from material (economic) to non-material issues 
(ideational). At other times, it seemed that sovereignty and security concerns set the 
tone in negotiations. 
One key problem in Hoffman’s intergovernmentalist account thus lays in its 
inexplicitness as regard the causal weight of each factor. He was hardly ever specific 	  
11 This can be seen as a crucial regressive step compared to the previous Treaty of 
Rome (signed in 1957) with which the European Economic Community (EEC) was 
established. 
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enough to pinpoint one or two of the three factors (international context, national 
interest, issue area) as the most decisive determinants of integration. This ambiguity in 
fact incited habitual confusion (Pollack 2012, 10). Yet, in view of the overall gist of 
Hofmann’s argument, scholars today conclude that the defining characteristic of his 
intergovernmentalist theory rest with its emphasis on national interest as the driving 
force of integration revolving around the preservation of national sovereignty and 
security (Schimmelfennig & Rittberger 2006, 81). As such, Hoffman’s account can 
readily be described as realist intergovernmentalist.12  
These being the main tenets of intergovernmentalism, can the theory be fruitfully 
brought to bear on the question of everyday policy making in EU external affairs? The 
answer is, in short, rather not. Intergovernmentalist theory may be strong in explaining 
why EU countries refrain form transferring competencies to supranational institutions in 
areas of high politics such as foreign and defense policy. These fields, after all, 
constitute core elements of national sovereignty, and being the defining face of the 
nation-state in the international arena, member states have long remained reluctant to 
communautarize these areas. On the other hand, intergovernmentalism is fairly weak in 
accounting for every-day policy making outcomes in the EU once policy areas are 
integrated. With its mere emphasis on national sovereignty and security, the theory 
simply falls short of generating viable theoretical propositions to understanding member 
states’ preferences and bargaining power on specific policy issues (e.g. visa policy with 
third countries), as it conceives of the second solely in terms of overall material power 
resources. 
It is in view of these shortcomings, subsequent scholarship has engaged in additional 
theorizing to fill the theoretical and empirical blind spots left open by Hoffmann and 
consorts. The most elaborate attempt at developing intergovernmentalist ideas further 
can be found in Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 1998) and what has been labeled liberal 
intergovernmentalis theory (LI). Today, LI is considered to be the baseline model in EU 
studies; that is to say, the approach against which other theories regularly position 
themselves (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009). We shall now turn to the discussion 
thereof.  
 	  
12 The difference to more recent liberal intergovernmentalist theory shall become clearer 
when discussing it later on) 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF EU EXTERNAL POLICY MAKING IN 
JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many EU interior ministers believe that they stand no chance of 
convincing their electorates that visa-free travel for Turks is a safe bet 
(Knaus and Siglmayer 2012) 
 
Given the central objective of this study to investigate member state dynamics that have 
driven a specific outcome in the external JHA policy dimension (EU-Turkey 
readmission-visa agreement), a theoretical framework centered around liberal 
intergovernmentalist (LI) theory suggests itself as the most viable way of going about 
the present analysis.13 Substantively speaking, two points tip in favor of doing so: First, 
LI bears the advantage of synthetic theorizing (Moravcsik 2003). It allows for the 
incorporation of rationalist variables other than economic interests which the researcher, 
for certain theoretical or empirical reasons, expects to have a bearing on political 
outcomes (see also Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009). This applies in particular to 
the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs domain which contains issues as delicate as 
migration, visa or border policy, where gains and losses from policies are rather 
difficult to calculate due to their largely political nature (Moravcsik 1993, 495). In fact, 
the European Commission itself has for these reasons early acknowledged that the JHA 
‘is different in nature from other parts of the Union’s acquis’ (Commission 1998a, cited 
in Stetter 2007, 150). This renders JHA a policy domain where political elites are likely 
to respond to other sources of domestic preferences (e.g. public opinion). Second, 	  
13 The terms liberal intergovernmentalist theory and liberal IR theory will be used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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matters related to Turkey-EU relations have traditionally been made subject to domestic 
power struggles within EU member states. This does not only apply to Turkey’s EU 
membership bid in general (Müftüler-Bac & McLaren 2003), but equally to individual 
policy issues related with the country. Taken together, these considerations point in 
favor of couching the present thesis in a liberal intergovernmentalist framework 
emphasizing the domestic societal preference configurations within member states. 
At this point a further qualification is in order. Hypotheses derived from liberal 
intergovernmentalist theory will not be tested in a stand-alone manner. The propositions 
will be assessed alongside a rival explanation derived from a competing approach in the 
literature: supranational institutionalism (SI). The rationale for doing so is 
methodological and leveled towards increasing confidence in the findings. Any 
proposition cannot be satisfactorily corroborated unless one can find convincing 
evidence militating against rival explanations. As influential methodologists have 
stressed, ‘assessing, and eliminating rival explanations is a fundamental concern in 
social research' (Collier et al. 2010, 161). SI is a particularly good candidate in this 
respect as it generates a diagonally opposed explanation (as compared to LI) to 
understanding the research puzzle at hand.  
 
3.1. Liberal Intergovernmentalism: State Preferences 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism represents an application of rationalist second-order 
theory to international politics (Pollack 2006). Influenced by earlier insights from 
intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist theory (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009, 
67), LI has achieved to generate a convincing account of major integrative 
developments in the history of the EU (Moravcsik 1993, 1998). The theory, however, 
does not only fare well in explaining grand intergovernmental treaty bargains in the EU 
(instances of ‘deepening’), but accounts equally well for EU enlargement developments 
(instances of ‘widening’), as well as everyday policy-making outcomes (see Moravcsik 
& Vachudova 2003; Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009, 74).14  LI theory thereby 
determinedly parts with conventional approaches in IR such as realism or 
intergovernmentalism insofar as it rejects the latters’ orthodox credo of conceiving state 	  
14 The term intergovernmental describes a decision-making rule that concede veto 
power and/or consent competency to member states. 
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interests in terms of of national security and sovereignty. Liberal intergovernmentalism, 
by contrast, argues that issue-specific state preferences are pivotal in the coming about 
of policy outcomes on the EU level.15 
For LI, a crucial prerequisite to prompting integration is international interdependence. 
Similar to neofunctionalist and supranationalist arguments, LI analysts view extant 
transnational exchange or cross-border transactions as a precondition for further 
integration. This idea is well reflected in the concept of demand and supply, whereby 
transnational exchange constitutes the demand side of integration and EU institutions 
and policies make up the supply side in the process (see Leuffen et al. 2012). To take 
the example of visa agreements as analyzed herein, a visa-free regime between the 
Schengen area and a given third country is most likely to be enforced where there is 
sufficient economic impetus for visa liberalization (e.g. trade, investment or tourism). 
Granted that this condition is fulfilled, LI proposes three distinct steps of analysis: state 
preferences, relative state power and institutional choice. Let us consider each in turn. 
State Preferences. LI analysis begins with the study of state preference configurations. 
Governmental preferences are understood to be the function of ‘constraints and 
opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic 
constituencies’ (Moravcsik 1998, 18; emphasis added). In some few instances 
geopolitical interests are said to matter as well. In most of the cases, however, state 
preferences have their roots in domestic economic interests, where powerful 
corporations’ voices weigh heaviest. In the process of interest articulation, domestic 
political institutions can play a key mediating role. For instance, in corporatist political 
systems interest group lobbying is organized via umbrella organizations working as a 
channel between domestic groups and the government. In pluralistically organized 
regimes, interest group mobilization is rather ad-hoc. The modalities of interest group 
pressure in these two types of regimes are therefore likely to differ. To sum up with 
Moravcsik: ‘the foreign policy goals of national governments are viewed as varying in 
response to shifting pressure from domestic social groups, whose preferences are 
aggregated through political institutions (Moravcsik 1993, 481). It is thereby important 
to note that LI sees economic interests neither as fixed nor as uniform. The preferences, 
or the goals and interests states pursue in the international arena for that matter, ‘vary 	  
15 Note that the notions of state and governmental preferences are used interchangeably 
all throughout this thesis. 
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among states and within the same state across time and issues according to issue-
specific societal interdependence and domestic institutions’ (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 69). Given the overwhelmingly non-economic nature of JHA 
policies, the costs and benefits involved therein are less evident and calculable than in 
other policy domains. This leads us to expect that in JHA domestic factors other than 
economic interest group are likely to exert a key influence on governments (e.g. public 
opinion). We shall elaborate upon this point in a moment. 
Relative Bargaining Power. The second analytical step in LI are interstate bargains 
where “national governments bring their preferences to the bargaining table in 
Brussels” (Pollack 2012, 10). Moravcsik thereby assumes that policy outcomes in the 
EU reflect the relative bargaining power of member states (Moravcsik 1998). Scholars 
have argued that differential power stems from the ‘asymmetrical distribution of 
information and of the benefits of a specific agreement’ (Leuffen et al. 2012, 45; 
emphasis added). The first source of bargaining power, informational advantage, posits 
that actors who have plenty of and qualitatively high information about a policy’s 
implications and other states’ domestic preferences are more likely to manipulate an 
outcome to their advantage (Cederman & Schneider 1994). A second source of 
bargaining power lies in a state’s discount rate. Actors satisfied with the status quo, 
with alternative policy options available, or in general less in need of a given 
agreement, possess higher bargaining power. In what LI conceives of as hard bargaining 
among member states, countries with higher bargaining power can put forward credible 
threats to veto policies which effectively pressures countries with divergent preferences 
towards the other (threatening) actors’ preferred positions. 
Institutional Choice. Institutional choice describes the process whereby states set up 
institutions and other mechanisms to bolster concluded deals. The issue thus revolves 
around governments’ concerns about one another’s future compliance after having 
obtained substantive agreements (Leuffen et al. 2012, 50). Supranational institutions are 
deliberately created by states to deal with matters of monitoring and sanctioning. These 
external mechanisms are thought to foster credible commitments among states and deter 
them from free-riding. The extent to which governments thereby pool authority and 
competences in supranational institutions depends on the issue in question, uncertainty 
about the future of the world, as well as the behavior of other governments (Koremenos 
et al. 2001).  
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To sum up, liberal intergovernmentalist theory is built on a multi-causal framework 
which distinguishes three distinct analytical steps: the analysis of state preferences, 
bargaining power, and institutional choice. Given our interest in the domestic dynamics 
that have driven a particular political outcome in the EU (Turkish visa issue), the main 
focus in this thesis will be on the analysis of state preferences. Doing so will help 
unravel the substantive underpinnings of the policy-process on the matter at hand. That 
being said, how can LI be brought to bear towards understanding member state 
preference dynamics in the EU’s justice and home affairs policies?  
 
3.1.1. Economic Interests 
 
When extended to EU external affairs and the readmission-visa agreements analyzed 
herein, the most obvious economic benefit for European countries in waiving visas for 
third states lies in the fact that travel and mobility can be markedly eased for touristic 
and business purposes. The possibility of smooth and uncomplicated travel is not only 
important for touristic reasons, but also plays a vital role for trade in terms of the 
maintenance and extension of trade relationships. Potential negative externalities of 
short-term visa-liberalization such as illegal immigration via visa overstaying are 
thereby counter-acted by the EU through a set of “prophylactic” measures. Most 
importantly, third countries are held to strengthen border control, introduce biometric 
passports, and establish the necessary infrastructure for data sharing with Schengen 
countries prior visa-free travel. In 2002, the EU added an additional tool to its 
repertoire: contracting parties are ever since required to sign a so-called readmission 
agreement in exchange for visa-facilitation or visa-waiver deals. Readmission 
agreements oblige third countries to re-admit illegal immigrants (‘sans papiers’16) who 
come from or transit via third states’ soil to EU territory. These measures, taken 
together, are tailored towards enabling the EU and its member states to reap the most 
benefit (trade and economic benefits) of visa-liberalization at the least possible expense 
(illegal immigration, crime etc.). Overall, based on LI’s emphasis on domestic 
economic interests we can deduce the following hypothesis for the present context: 
 	  
16 Sans papiers is a term coined in French, thought of as a politically more correct way 
of referring to illegal immigrants. 
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Hypothesis 1 (Economic Interests): domestic economic interests drive member 
state preferences on EU readmission-visa agreements with third countries  
 
The empirical implications of the latter proposition are as follows: we should expect 
member state governments to be in favor of lifting visa-restrictions with third countries 
with which they maintain significant economic relations because eased travel is 
conducive to the establishment and extension of trade, investment and tourism 
relationships. In the present research context, the economic interests variable will thus 
be measured by looking at three indicators: 1) trade relations (exports to Turkey both in 
absolute value and share of total), 2) investment flows, and 3) outbound tourism from 
Turkey. As regard trade relations, it is assumed that the purchasing party (importer) will 
need to pay regular visits to the selling party (exporter), be it for product presentation, 
the closure of deals and similar activities that require personal contact. Thus, assessing a 
country’s interest in easing travel for third country nationals goes by way of looking at 
member states’ export patterns - carrying the thought further, one can say that export-
oriented industries gain most from visa liberalization. As regard investment outflows, 
patterns similar to those reported in trade relations apply. It is unlikely that an investor 
would like to provide capital for a project at a place that s/he can only visit with 
significant difficulties (visa restrictions). Thus, investment relations should spur 
governmental interest in visa exemption as well. Finally, as regard tourism, member 
states which maintain or expect significant tourism potential from Turkey, should be 
supportive of visa-free travel, or visa-facilitation arrangements as eased travel 
possibilities will be an important consideration for tourists.17 It should be noted that, 
with these indicators, the economic interest variable is thought and measured at a very 
general level (macro-perspective). This approach to measurement is taken here 
following LI’s theoretical emphasis on the seminal role of big businesses and 
corporations. 
 	  
17 Take the recent example of Croatia. With its accession to the EU (1 July 2013) 
Croatia has been held to align its visa regime with the EU’s Schengen acquis. This 
required the Croatian government to introduce visa requirements for Turkish citizens. 
Croatia did so only unwillingly with its touristic branches reporting that visa obligations 
are likely to cause a substantial reduction in inbound tourism from Turkey, see 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/asianet/130403/croatia-imposes-visas-
turkish-citizens (Accessed 10 April 2013) 
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3.1.2. Public Opinion 
 
LI’s argument that domestic economic interest groups pose a crucial constraint upon 
government surely constitutes a plausible claim. Yet, it is rather difficult to maintain 
that economic interest group pressure per se is sufficient in shaping governmental 
preferences across the board of policy domains.18 In fact, Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 
(two prominent LI scholars) have themselves suggested that the theoretical foundations 
of liberal intergovernmentalist theory as regard the sources of domestic preference 
formation need to be more fully elaborated to understand peculiar dynamics in areas 
such as internal security and immigration (1999, 83) - it is at this juncture where the 
present research sets to make a theoretical contribution also. 
Extant literature has worked out public opinion as another crucial source of domestic 
preference formation in the EU (see also Hooghe & Marks 2009; Büthe et al. 2002, 13; 
Schneider 1995; Anderson 1998; Risse-Kappen 1991, 480). Here it is likewise argued 
here that domestic sentiments work as a crucial constraint upon government. Public 
opinion matters particularly with EU policy areas that are conceived of as delicate and 
sensitive by EU citizens among which are, most notably, JHA policies such as 
immigration, border and visa policy. This is so for the following reasons: first, the issue 
of immigration has become a highly politicized and securitized matter in many EU 
member states (Huysmans 2006). Debates on the subject are oftentimes polemic and 
revolve around economic and cultural threat arguments.19 Second, it has been shown 
that European publics are particularly informed and sensitive about immigration-related 
policies (Lahav 2004, 1152). As Leuffen et al. state (2011, 47), in immigration policies, 
among others, the distribution of “preferences in the electorate, complement – and may 
even override – economic interests.” On the matter at hand, it is thus unlikely to expect 
	  
18 Moravcsik himself has conceded a role to geopolitical concerns in rare instances 
where economic interests where not decisive (Moravcsik 1998, 18). Geopolitical factors 
are, however, unlikely to play a role in the present context.   
 
19 Note that this is not to downplay potential country-related variation. 
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indifferent publics which makes it even more difficult for elites to surpass them when 
engaging in EU policy making.20 
To avoid misunderstanding, increased political awareness and knowledgeability on the 
part of EU citizens is not in and of itself sufficient in bringing public opinion to matter 
for the domestic preference formation process – awareness would only be sufficient if 
there were institutional ratification mechanisms (e.g. referenda) in place. This, however, 
is not the case in most EU states and certainly not in those to be analyzed, for 
substantive reasons, later on. By and large, it is therefore political elites and an 
existential concern on their part that makes them responsive to public sentiments: 
staying in power. As Hobolt states, “national governments will generally seek to adopt 
policy positions in line with voter preferences in order to ensure re-election” (Hobolt 
2012, 727). Politics, after all, is a myopic business which revolves around serving 
interest of which the greatest is the political protagonists’ own, that is re-election. 
At the theoretical level, the argument advanced herein builds upon Robert Putnam’s 
(1988) two-level game idea and, as such, is compatible with liberal intergovernmentalist 
core assumptions emphasizing the role of domestic societal preferences. In a two-level 
game, governmental elites bargain at two tables simultaneously, the domestic and the 
international, whereby the range of acceptable agreements (win-set) for a government is 
conceived as a function of domestic constraints, as well as the policy preferences of 
other states. Anderson, with a view on public opinion as a constraining force upon 
government, describes this idea as follows: 
 
	  
20 It needs to be stressed at this point that EU publics’ awareness on immigration is not 
a peculiar development but really part of broader alterations in the modalities of policy 
making in the EU. Over the last two decades, EU politics has undergone major changes 
in this regard. While in the early integration years, European publics have largely been 
quiescent to the dealings of their political leaders, today policy making in the EU is no 
longer simply an elite-business anymore. Nor is it solely driven by the interests of big 
and powerful economic corporations. National elites nowadays more than often ever 
find themselves prompted to consider the sentiments of their domestic constituencies 
when engaging in EU policy making. As Hooghe and Marks state, politics in the EU is 
no longer characterized by a permissive consensus, of deals cut by insulated elites. 
Today, European publics are more ever than ever about their political leaders dealings. 
Advancements in communicative means are likely to have played a key role in this 
respect. The new modalities of policy-making in the EU are characterized by a 
constraining dissensus (Hooghes & Marks 2009, 5) 
 26  
The structure of domestic opinion among the publics of the member 
states is likely to be a crucial ingredient that determines the types of 
bargains struck at the supranational level because it can impose different 
constraints on decision makers at the European level (Anderson 1998, 
571). 
 
Overall, the complexity and diversity of EU politics favors nuanced and middle-range 
explanatory models rather than highly generalized and parsimonious accounts. 
Depending on the policy matter at hand, different concerns will be at stake and different 
actors at the levers. As Schimmelfennig and Rittberger have argued, with integration 
expanding “into other sectoral domains, other interests and interest groups become 
relevant” (Schimmelfennig & Rittberger 2006, 80). In the realm of delicate and 
sovereignty-sensitive JHA policies, it is posited here, a crucial source of national 
preference is public opinion. Having said that, the next question lies in laying out the 
causal mechanisms through, and conditions under which public opinion matters. 
Causal Mechanism. As with all theoretical arguments there needs to be a mechanism 
linking the explanatory variable with the dependent variable. Drawing upon insights 
from the extant literature (Bourbeau 2011, see also Hooghe & Marks 2009 for an 
analogous mechanism: politicization21) it is posited here that securitization is the causal 
mechanic that actuates public opinion as the source of governmental preference in JHA 
policies. Securitization is thereby understood as a causal mechanism, one which does 
not operate in a universal law-like fashion but becomes activated through political 
entrepreneurship and can find facilitating or constraining conditions depending upon the 
national context (Guzzini 2011). In a sense, then, securitization resembles the 
mechanism of politicization (Hooghe & Marks 2009) in that it also raises issue salience 
and stirs public debate. Yet, the crucial difference attention between the two 
mechanisms lies in securitization’s additional embodiment of security and policing 
discourses. Allow me to elaborate. 
	  
21 Some scholars have posited that politicization constitutes the main mechanism 
through which public opinion is brought to matter in EU policy making (Hooghe and 
Marks 2008). However, more recent research finds that politicization’s effect on 
legislative output in the EU has in fact been existent up until the late 1990s, but has 
significantly decreased ever since (Toshkov 2011).  
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Policies can be conceived on a spectrum ranging from de-politicized, to politicized, and 
to securitized (Emmers 2010). Figure 1 depicts this spectrum. A non-politicized issue is 
one which does not enter public debate. In this arena, policy-makers go about their 
dealings behind closed doors. For instance, much of the EU’s technical and regulatory 
legislation is dealt with by national governments in this manner. Politicization, by 
contrast, describes a process whereby an issue is taken out of restricted policy networks 
and bureaucracies and brought into public debate. As such, it enters the standard 
political system (Buzan et al. 1998, 23). Finally, we speak of securitization where an 
issue becomes integrated into discursive and institutional frameworks emphasizing 
security and policing (see Bourbeau 2011, 43). As a result of securitization (that is, the 
process of casting something as a threat), issues are transformed from the domain of 
low politics into high where national security and autonomy concerns become 
prevalent. It should be noted, though, that the policy-process generally takes place in the 
non-politicized or politicized arenas, securitization therewith describing a rather 
exceptional state of affairs. 
 
Figure 1. Securitization as a Causal Mechanism 
Adapted from Emmers (2010, 138) 
 
Whether an issue becomes politicized or securitized thereby depends not on its intrinsic 
importance but on whether political elites pick it up (Hooghe & Marks 2009). For 
instance, in some societies immigration may be perceived of as a good “thing” in that it 
can be underpinned by discourses which highlight the benefits of immigration (e.g. 
brain-gain, cultural diversity). In other societies immigration may be perceived of as a 
threatening issue, with discourses dominating that stress the ostensibly threatening 
qualities thereof (e.g. causes unemployment, endangers national culture). How 
immigration ultimately fares, however, hinges upon political elites’ portrayal thereof as 
well as contextual factors. Historical contingencies such as a (labor) immigration past 
can work as important facilitating conditions for securitization (more on this in a 
moment). Conceptualizing of policies on a spectrum reaching from non-politicized to 
securitized, we thus conceive of the prospect of elites attending to public opinion to 
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increase the more an issue moves toward the “securitized” pole.22 On this score, the 
argument diverges from earlier accounts that have pointed at politicization being 
sufficient for activating public opinion as the main source of governmental preferences 
(e.g. Hooghe & Marks 2009). Subsequent work has in fact shown that this claim finds 
no significant empirical corroboration (Toshkov 2011).23 
A final issue that merits consideration pertains to the direction of the causal arrow in the 
relationship between elites and their publics. Is it a top-down process whereby elites 
respond to public attitudes (electoral connection), is it a bottom-up process where the 
public adopts positions of preferred political elites (cue-taking). In principle, both 
directions are conceivable. Important to bear in mind is that, ultimately, the audience 
(that is, the public) will need to accept a portrayed threat for it to go through as such 
(Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007). So there is likely to be a feedback effect between elite 
positions and public opinion. An entrenched negative attitudinal structure on a given 
policy within society can provide incentives for elites to engage in securitization moves. 
Conversely, security-framing attempts on the part of elites can also work towards 
shaping public stances on a given issue.24 In any case – and this is the most important 
point to drive home in this context – political entrepreneurs are the key actors. 
Facilitating Conditions. Scholars too often pay insufficient attention to contextual 
factors in analyzing political outcomes (Levy 2007, 198). This represents a crucial 
drawback insofar as the context can pose important enabling or constraining conditions 
for the securitization of issues. Again, building upon seminal literature (Bourbeau 2011, 
123), it is assumed that securitization can find facilitating conditions in the peculiarities 
of the national context. For instance, historical legacies (immigration history) or 
regime-specific features (welfare state, immigrant incorporation system) can facilitate 
the securitization of policy issues. These features can thereby work in tangible as well 
	  
22 This implies that there is a possibility of variation also as regard the extent to which 
issues can be securitized. 
 
23 In particular, Toshkov (2011) argues that while for the 1990s the posited effect of 
politicization on public opinion finds some empirical support, the relationship does not 
hold for contemporary EU politics. 
 
24 To be sure, the causal direction question is in itself an interesting research matter. In 
the present context, however, it shall be set aside because it does not represent a central 
issue and for the purpose of facilitating analysis. 
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as more diffuse ways along a continuum ranging from enabling to constraining 
capacities for the securitization of issues (Bourbeau 2011, 123). Conversely, where no 
historical or institutional contingencies are present securitization is likely to find a 
constraining environment.25 
Stylized Model. Based on the explications made thus far, Figure 2 presents a stylized 
model depicting the modalities of domestic preference formation with securitized issues 
in JHA and under normal conditions. Path 1 portrays the public opinion model 
hypothesized herein. Therein it is theorized that public sentiments become relevant as a 
source for governmental preferences if a given policy issue is securitized (causal 
mechanism). 26  As mentioned above, the national context (e.g. historical legacies, 
regime-specific characteristics) can thereby work as a facilitating factor. Given the fact 
that migration has become both politicized and securitized in the EU (Huysmans 2006), 
public opinion can be expected to play a decisive role in domestic preference formation 
processes in JHA (see also Hooghe & Marks 2009, 18).  
 
Figure 2. A Stylized Model of Domestic Preference Formation in Justice and Home 
Affairs: Public Opinion vs. Interest Group Pressure 
 
 
 	  
25 The national context, in turn, to tie the argument to the explications made further 
above, are likely to play an important role in shaping public opinion in the first place. 
 
26 In principle, a feedback effect from public opinion to securitization may be 
conceivable as well. That is to say, securitization can actuate public opinion as a source 
of governmental preference configuration, but public opinion itself may as well exert an 
effect back on securitization (constraining, enabling). This is a point which overlaps 
with the discussion on “facilitating conditions” above. 
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Path 2, by contrast, depicts the standard liberal intergovernmentalist account. Domestic 
interest groups exert pressure upon government which is filtered through domestic 
political institutions. The way lobbying activities are exercised in particular hinges upon 
the configuration of political institutions (e.g. pluralist vs. corporatist interest 
representation systems). In sum, and based on the preceding explications, we may thus 
deduce the following proposition on the role of public opinion: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Public Opinion): Public opinion drives state preferences on EU 
readmission-visa agreements with third countries where the issue at hand is 
securitized 
 
A key implication which follows from the preceding explications is that public 
sentiments in EU external policy making with Justice and Home Affairs policies should 
matter most as sources of governmental preferences in member states that look back at 
some sort of immigration past (e.g. Turkish labor immigration). In such contexts 
attempts at securitization are likely to encounter specifically fertile grounds and thus 
shape governmental policy positions.  
 
Material and Ideational Sources of Threat Perceptions. Having outlined the basic tenets 
of our model, the next task lies in sketching out the factors that underpin public 
sentiments on immigration-related policies. Generally speaking, the literature 
distinguishes two models in this respect: utilitarian and ideational explanations. Let us 
consider each in turn. 
Gabel (1998) and Anderson (1998) have been among the first authors to advance the 
argument that individual-level utilitarian considerations account for variance in public 
support for EU integration. While such individualistic explanations have initially fared 
well, recent work has moved towards developing more nuanced models.27 Most notably, 
scholars have gone at great lengths to test the role of ideational factors in shaping 
citizens’ attitudes on issues (Hooghe & Marks 2004; Luedtke 2005, McLaren 2006). 	  
27 Two prominent authors in the field, Hooghes and Marks (2004) have in this regard 
argued that it ‘is fruitless to seek general validity in either economic or identity theories 
of preferences. We need to inquire into their relative causal power’. 
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Lauren McLaren, whose work can be situated within the latter strand of research, has 
embarked upon distilling the precise impact of utilitarian and ideational factors on 
public attitudes towards the EU and its policies. Based on a comprehensive analysis of 
Eurobarometer survey data, she finds that neither a utilitarian nor an ideational approach 
is in and of itself able to account for the range of variance in public attitudes on the EU 
and its policies. Rather, so McLaren’s argument, a mix of individual and group-level 
economic resources and identity concerns best account for variation in attitudes vis-à-
vis the EU and its policies.28  
Building upon the latter strand of research, scholars of European Integration have found 
for the Turkish case in particular that group-level economic and group-level cultural 
threat perceptions are the main drivers of public attitudes towards Turkey’s EU 
membership as well as policies related with Turkey (McLaren 2007, 251; De Vreese et 
al. 2008). There is reason to assume that the same dynamics should apply to EU 
external affairs policy issues related with Turkey as well. Following McLaren’s 
pioneering work, two public opinion models are considered for analysis: The group-
conflict (perceived economic threat) and the symbolic politics (perceived cultural threat) 
approaches.  
Group-Conflict Hypothesis. The group-conflict approach posits that an association of 
people will take a hostile stance towards a certain out-group if it perceives of the latter 
as a threat to its economic resources (McLaren 2006, 50-51).29 The idea is that 
economic threat perceptions will arise where certain outsiders/groups are conceived of 
as potential competitors over domestic economic resources. In the context of public 
opinion research it is posited that the perception of threat to a society’s economic 
resources (e.g. social welfare, employment) drives citizens’ attitudes toward EU 
policies. Economic threat perceptions, however, do not take hold in society in and of 	  
28 De Vreese et al. (2008) in their analysis of EU citizens’ support for Turkish 
membership, later arrived at very similar conclusions in arguing that public attitudes on 
Turkey’s EU vision are not so much driven by economic rationality, as suggested by 
authors such as Gabel and Anderson, but rather by ‘soft’ factors including feelings of 
identity and attitudes towards immigrants.  
 
29 Group conflict theory, an approach from social psychology developed in the context 
of ethnic group research posits that a group, which perceives a threat to its resources 
from another out-group, will take a hostile stance towards the latter (McLaren 2004, 50-
51).  
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themselves. Such sentiments take hold via the mechanism of securitization. As noted 
earlier, political leaders and/or the media seek to politicize and securitize issues where 
they see electoral advantage in doing so (Hooghe & Marks 2009, 18). Based on these 
group-conflict theoretical considerations, we can deduce the following hypothesis for 
the present context: 
 
Hypothesis 2a (Group-Conflict): Threat perceptions over domestic economic 
resources underpin public opinion on cross-border mobility 
 
As regard empirical implications, domestic threat perceptions over economic resources 
should be particularly pronounced in member states which maintain a social welfare 
system. The latter are generally more attractive to immigrants. As a response, 
governments of social welfare states should be wary about visa-liberalization with third 
countries (Razin & Wahba 2011, 7). Another expectation is that economic threat 
perceptions can be expected where a significant and/or a politically salient population of 
Turkish immigrants dwells. The reasoning is that immigration experience/history is 
likely to spur concerns over material welfare. 
Symbolic-Politics Hypothesis. Different than the group-conflict approach, which 
emphasizes competition over economic resources, the symbolic politics approach 
highlights the role of national identity and culture as sources of threat perceptions 
(McLaren 2006, 69).30  The approach thereby draws heavily upon insights from social 
identity theory (see Tajfel 1970) with its emphasis on identity as a crucial component of 
human life. Building upon this assumption, the symbolic politics approach posits that 
identity, culture and a society’s ‘way of life’ are defended against potential ‘intruders’ 
from the outside because these are objects that a group (or society) holds dear. It 
follows that hostility towards a certain out-group ‘serves the purpose of protecting the 
norms, values and way of life of the [in-] group and maintaining group distinctiveness’ 
(McLaren 2006, 72). The mechanisms through which threat perceptions vis-à-vis out-
groups thereby take hold in society is analogous to the one discussed in the context of 
	  
30 Scholarship has not only demonstrated that European publics are often quite informed 
and sensitive to EU migration policies (Lahav 2004, 1152), but also found that 
ideational concerns frequently overweigh economic interests in that domain (Luedtke 
2005).  
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group-conflict theory. In sum, from the symbolic politics approach we are able to 
deduce the following third proposition: 
 
Hypothesis 2b (Symbolic-Politics): Threat perceptions over national identity and 
culture underpin public opinion on cross-border mobility 
 
The empirical implications of the latter proposition are as follows: where a significant 
and/or a politically salient population of Turkish immigrants resides, symbolic threat 
perceptions can be expected to be most pronounced. Again, the underlying reasoning is 
that ideational concerns are likelier to take roots in societies that have at least had some 
experiences with immigration (e.g. Turkish labor recruitment) in the past.31  
 
3.2. Rival Explanation: Supranational Agency 
 
Having mapped out the main tenets of our liberal intergovernmentalist framework, we 
shall now turn to the discussion of a rival theory,32 supranational institutionalism. 
Supranational institutionalism (SI), differs from LI in that it is based on a different 
ontology. Instead of committing itself to a purely state-centric view, SI takes a 
pluralistic approach by ascribing transnational and non-governmental actors an 
important role, too. Let us consider its assumptions and propositions in detail. 
 
3.2.1. Supranational Institutionalism 
 
Supranational institutionalism (SI) is the product of a recent attempt by political 
scientists to revise and update neofunctionalist ideas to the study of regional integration. 
At its core, supranational institutionalist theory is based on the assumption that 
transnational exchange (e.g. trade, investment, networks, associations) “provokes 
supranational organizations to make rules designed to facilitate and to regulate the 	  
31 The importance of historical legacies and path-dependencies has been corroborated 
by historical institutionalist analyses on various occasions. 
 
32 Assessing rival explanations has been described as an important component of 
rigorous social scientific inquiry (Brady & Collier 2010). The present study is keen on 
following this state-of-the-art methodological advice. 
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development of transnational society” (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1997, 313). It is social 
and political interest groups that are mainly interested in advancing integration. In this 
respect SI very much concurs with liberal intergovenmentalist theory which postulates 
that ‘dense international interactions [in SI parlance: transnational exchange] create a 
situation of international interdependence (Leuffen et al. 2012, 64) which, in turn, raises 
demand for further integration. The integration process is thereby understood to 
generate ‘a self-reinforcing dynamic which begets further integration and which 
governments did not intend, which they are unable to control or to reverse’ 
(Schimmelfennig & Rittberger 2006, 89). This idea of ‘path dependency’ and other 
historical institutional concepts such as ‘increased returns’ and ‘sunk costs’ feature 
prominently in supranationalist institutionalist analyses (Pierson 2000). 
The main actors in SI are conceived in a plural fashion: states, transnational and 
supranational actors. These agents are expected to push for further integration where 
cross-border (economic) transactions between EU states and third countries reach a 
level considerable enough to spur the need for international coordination. Political 
initiatives sought on the supranational level in response to transnational pressure, in 
turn, lead to further integration and oftentimes also to the expansion of supranational 
actors’ policy-making competencies (historically, this occurred particularly through 
ECJ precedent rulings). While supranationalists do not per se reject 
intergovernmentalist theory’s emphasis on national preferences and relative bargaining 
power, SI scholars argue that actors such as the European Commission, the European 
Parliament, and the European Court of Justice possess their own substantial legal and 
political powers which they utilize towards the end of advancing regional integration 
(Stone Sweet & Sandholz 1997, 312).  
Scholars working from the SI perspective have distilled three distinct causal 
mechanisms through which further integration is conceived to take place. These are the 
so-called spillover mechanisms which principally come in three variants: functional, 
political, and institutional spillover (Schmitter 1969). Functional spillover describes a 
situation in which the interconnectedness of policy sectors poses an impetus for further 
integration in hitherto un-integrated areas. This idea of interdependence is reflected in 
the concept of externalities (which can be positive or negative). As Schimmelfennig and 
Rittberger put it, ‘the externalities of sectoral integration incite governments to 
undertake further, previously unplanned, steps of sectoral integration in order to prevent 
welfare losses’ (2006, 85). Political spillover, on the other hand, describes a process 
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whereby political actors, over the course of time, acquire a new sense of loyalty to a 
supranational ‘center’. This leads political actors to exercise pressure, both upon 
domestic and supranational foci of power, directed towards the end of advancing 
regional integration. Finally, institutional spillover designates a process whereby 
supranational actors engage in deliberate integrative attempts (e.g. European 
Commission, Parliament, Court of Justice). These actors do so, within the limits of their 
competencies, and in response to heightened cross-border transactions and transnational 
pressure (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1997, 299). From supranationalist institutionalism 
we may thus deduce the following proposition for the present context: 
 
Alternative Hypothesis 3 (Supranational Agency): Supranational Actors advance 
integration on EU readmission-visa agreements triggered by cross-border 
exchange and transnational pressure 
 
The empirical implications of the latter hypothesis are as follows: where sufficient 
cross-border transaction and/or transnational pressure is given, we should observe 
supranational actors such as the European Commission or the European Court of Justice 
actively engaging in advancing integration on readmission-visa agreements with third 
countries. This should manifest itself in statements, communications and court rulings. 
The most obvious prediction of all generated from this perspective is that supranational 
actors’ integrative initiatives, or ECJ rulings for that matter, will be decisive in bringing 
about the respective policy outcome (here readmission-visa agreements). 
 
3.3. Summary: Hypotheses and Predictions 
 
Table 2 gives an overview of our study hypotheses and their empirical implications. 
This being the theoretical framework of this study we may now begin with the empirical 
analysis. I shall start off with an examination of EU-Turkey visa policy in historical 
perspective. This will help put the later analysis into perspective. 
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Table 2. Study Hypotheses and Empirical Implications 
Theoretical 
Framework Hypothesis Empirical Implications 
LI
B
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L 
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O
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N
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Hypothesis 1 
(Economic Interests) 
Domestic Economic Interests drive 
member state preferences on EU 
readmission-visa agreements  
 
 
- member states which maintain significant 
economic relations with a given third country 
should be in favor of visa-waiver/facilitation 
agreements. Three indicators are drawn upon in 
the present context: trade, investment and 
tourism. 
 
Hypothesis 2  
(Public Opinion) 
Domestic Public Opinion drives 
member state preferences on EU 
readmission-visa agreements where 
the issue at hand is securitized 
 
- public opinion will matter in JHA policies 
where the issue at hand is securitized. The latter 
can find facilitating conditions in the national 
context (e.g. Turkish immigration history).  
 
 
Hypothesis 2a 
(Group-Conflict Hypothesis)  
Threat perceptions over domestic 
economic resources underpin public 
opinion on cross-border mobility 
 
- Domestic threat perceptions over economic 
resources should be particularly pronounced in 
member states which maintain higher levels of 
social spending and harbor a significant and/or 
politically salient Turkish immigrant population.  
Hypothesis 2b 
(Symbolic-Politics Hypothesis) 
Threat perceptions over national 
identity and culture underpin public 
opinion on immigration on cross-
border mobility 
 
- ideational threat perceptions should be 
particularly pronounced in EU countries which 
harbor a significant and/or politically salient 
Turkish immigrant population  
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  Alternative Hypothesis 3 
(Supranational Agency) 
Supranational Actors advance 
integration on EU readmission-visa 
agreements triggered by cross-
border exchange and transnational 
pressure 
 
- we should observe the European Commission 
and the ECJ actively engaging in integration-
furthering action on readmission-visa 
agreements. Key prediction: political initiatives 
and/or court rulings on the supranational level 
will have a decisive impact on political outcomes 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: EUROPEAN AND TURKISH VISA POLICY 
IN PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The legal basis for the freedom of movement of persons and workers between the EU 
and Turkey can be traced back to the Ankara Agreement signed between Turkey and the 
European Economic Community (EEC, which is the EU’s predecessor) in 1960 
(entering into force on 1 January 1963) and an additional protocol concluded in 1970 (in 
force since 1 January 1973). These agreements have inter alia set the schedule for the 
gradual realization of freedom of movement to be achieved at the latest twenty-two 
years from the entry into force of the agreement – i.e. between 1976 and 1986 
(Groenendijk & Guild 2011) and delineated rights and obligations of the contracting 
parties. Article 41(1) of the additional protocol is of particular importance in the light of 
the issue of visa restrictions. It states the following: “the Contracting Parties shall 
refrain from introducing between themselves any new restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services.”33 This stipulation has come to be 
referred to as the so-called standstill clause. The latter obliges the contracting parties to 
refrain from introducing restrictions on access to their territory for nationals of the other 
party. The standstill clause came into effect on 1 January 1973 with the entering into 
force of the additional protocol. We will come back to this clause and implications in a 
moment when assessing the supranational institutionalist rival explanation. 
 
What were EU countries’ visa policies towards Turkey before and after the coming into 
force of the Ankara Agreement and the additional protocol? Among those member 	  
33 http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21970A1123(01):EN:HTML 
(Accessed 15 May 2013) 
 38  
states that have concluded bilateral visa free travel agreements with Turkey, to name a 
few important countries, are Italy (1951), Germany (1953), the Netherlands (1953), 
Finland (1954), France (1954), and Belgium (1956).34 These agreements allowed for 
visa free short-time travel (up to 90 days) for the contracting countries’ nationals. All of 
these bilateral visa agreements were still in force at the time of the Ankara Agreement 
and its additional protocol’s coming into effect in 1973 (more on this in light of the 
discussion of the ECJ’s Soysal ruling). 
Up until the 1980s, Turkish nationals were able to travel to these and many other 
European countries without visa restrictions (Abadan-Unat 2011). However, growing 
civil unrest and intensifying political turmoil in Turkey in the second half of the 1970s 
changed the situation fundamentally. An increasing number of political and non-
political asylum seekers turned to Europe for refugee. To illustrate, Germany alone 
registered 57.913 asylum requests from Turkey in 1980, as compared to merely 809 in 
1970.35As a consequence, following the years after the Turkish military coup of 1980 
almost all European countries except England and Italy required Turkish citizens to 
obtain a visa (Abadan-Unat, 2011, 20). At the same time, the mobility terms agreed 
upon in the Ankara Agreement were put on hold.  
With the coming into force of Schengen in 1995, states partaking in the agreement were 
obliged to annul previous bilateral arrangements. Turkey was placed on Schengen’s so-
called visa “black list” meaning that its citizens were subjected to visa restrictions to 
travel to Schengen countries. The first of such visa lists was adopted at the meeting of 
ministers of the Member States in Copenhagen in December 1987 coming into force in 
1989 (Groenendijk & Guild 2011, 53). Turkey was also black listed on subsequent visa 
lists adopted by the Schengen Executive Committee in 1993, the list of EC Regulation 
2317/9570, EC Regulation 574/199971 and, lastly, the negative list of EC Regulation 
539/2001 which incorporated the intergovernmental Schengen agreement into EU law. 
To date, Turkey remains on Schengen’s visa black list.  
	  
34 To be sure, this list is not exhaustive but includes mainly those member states that are 
deemed important in light of the present analysis. 
 
35 Statistisches Bundesamt (German Federal Statistical Office) Jahrbuch 1995 
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As noted, Schengen was integrated into the EU’s legal framework on 1 May 1999 
following the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997).36 Ever since Schengen’s 
incorporation into the EU, membership aspirant countries are held to bring their border 
and visa policy in line with Community law before joining the Union (except the UK, 
Ireland and Denmark who have negotiated opt-outs from Schengen). As a result, newer 
member states that joined the EU in the 2005 and 2007 enlargement rounds were 
required to annul previous bilateral visa agreements concluded with Turkey. Among 
these were Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania and 
Malta who acceded to the EU in 2005, as well as Bulgaria and Romania who joined in 
2007. Most recently, Croatia was also forced to terminate its bilateral visa agreement 
with Turkey (April 2013) due to its EU membership accession in July 2013. 
In view of these developments, how has Turkey designed its visa policy towards EU 
countries?37 Generally speaking, Turkish visa policy towards member states is not 
uniform but rather characterized by a differential approach. Turkish authorities thereby 
distinguish two groups of countries: one whose nationals are exempted from visa 
obligations, and the other who are held to obtain a visa over the internet (e-visa).38 
Currently, 15 EU member states are waived visa obligations for entering the territory of 
the Turkish republic. These are Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Greece, Finland, France, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Slovenia, Sweden, Romania and 
Bulgaria. Citizens of these countries holding ordinary passports can stay in Turkey up to 
90 days within a total period of 180 days. Latvian citizens are also exempted from visa 
but can only stay up to 30 days. Nationals of 13 EU member states are presently 
subjected to visa restrictions. These are Austria, Belgium, Hungary, the Netherlands, 	  
36http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_
persons_asylum_immigration/l33020_en.htm (Accessed 30 May 2013). It is important 
to note that Denmark, Ireland were granted special provisions in that they do not fully 
partake in the Schengen agreement (see link above for more information). 
 
37 The following information is taken from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
URL: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/visa-information-for-foreigners.en.mfa (Accessed 30 May 
2013). 
 
38 As of May 2013, Turkish authorities have put into force a new and simplified online 
visa application system (e-visa). Previously, travellers were hold to obtain visas at 
Turkish border control points (note that this stands in stark contrast to Schengen and 
other countries’ practices which require individuals to apply for visas in their 
homelands at the consulates and embassies of the country of destination).  
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Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Croatia, Slovakia, Malta and the 
Republic of Cyprus. A visa costs €15 and needs to paid by credit cart via the online e-
visa system. Whereas the majority of these country nationals obtain visas for a stay up 
to 90 days, Slovakian and Cypriot citizens are subjected to a differential treatment, 
being permitted a stay on Turkish soil up to 30 days only. 
Where do we stand today? Despite Turkey’s long-standing association history with the 
EU, it is yet to attain a visa-waiver for her citizens for short-term travel to the Schengen 
Area. By contrast, five Western Balkan candidate countries have already abolished visa 
restrictions in return for signing readmission agreements with the EU. In particular, the 
EU has lifted visa-restrictions for Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia in 2009, as well 
as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania in 2010. The EU has also concluded visa-
facilitation agreements with Georgia (2011), Russia (2008) and the Ukraine (2008) - the 
latter being countries without a genuine membership perspective in the EU. These, one 
could argue, are perfect instances of EU-conditionality at work (Kelley 2004). In this 
light Trauner and Kruse see in readmission-visa agreements a new foreign policy 
instrument the EU has recently started utilizing: ‘in offering more relaxed travel 
conditions in exchange for the signing of a … readmission agreement and reforming 
domestic justice and home affairs, the EU has found a new way to press for reforms in 
neighbouring countries’ (Trauner & Kruse, 2008: 2). This fact generates a host of 
interesting questions in the present research context. What supranational and/or member 
state level dynamics have driven the Turkey-EU readmission-visa outcome? Which 
states were in favor or against Turkish visa liberalization, and why? These and other 
questions will be part of the probe embarked upon on the ensuing pages. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
ANALYZING CONTEMPORARY EU VISA POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter three has mapped out our liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) theoretical 
framework and formulated a supranational institutionalist (SI) rival explanation. On the 
most general level, LI’s take on explaining the policy outcome in the case of Turkey’s 
Schengen visa liberalization would revolve around analyzing domestic societal 
preferences. An SI approach, in contrast, would lay in scrutinizing the integration-
promoting activities of transnational and supranational actors such as the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice. 
In what follows I shall proceed by first assessing the veracity of the supranational 
institutionalist rival explanation (Alternative Hypothesis 3). The rationale for doing so 
is grounded in the consideration that ruling out potentially rival accounts should precede 
the testing of one’s theoretically/empirically chosen explanation. Having done so, I will 
turn to gauge the explanatory veracity of the main theoretical argument advanced 
herein, namely, that public opinion becomes the main source of state preferences where 
the issue at hand is securitized.  
 
5.1. Supranational Agency 
 
As noted, supranationalist institutitionalist theory directs our attention to the role of 
transnational actors in furthering regional integration. This is particularly important to 
bear in mind in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) where EU decision making is largely 
governed by the ordinary legislative procedure (community method).39 The critical 	  
39 The ordinary legislative procedure (community method) has been introduced to JHA 
with the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. It basically means the 
involvement of supranational institutions in the policy process and qualified majority 
voting (QMA) in the Council, unless stated otherwise for a given policy issue in the EU 
treaties.  
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actors to analyze in this respect are the European Commission and the European Court 
of Justice who are said to be integration-friendly institutions of the EU (Stone Sweet & 
Sandholtz 2012). For reasons of complementarity, the activities of the European 
Council and European Parliament will be analyzed as well. Let us briefly review the 
decision-making competencies of EU institutions with readmission agreements before 
beginning with the analysis. 
Readmission agreements are part of the external dimension of JHA as they are directed 
towards non-member states. EC Article 79(3) and Article 218 of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the EU (TFEU) stipulate that the Council take decisions on readmission 
agreements by qualified majority voting (QMV). This mechanism usually forces 
member states into seeking a common European position on policy issues. The 
Commission is vested with the power of drafting and initiating legislative proposal; in 
JHA, however, its right of initiative is non-exclusive (Monar 2011, 124). The 
Commission also operates as the chief negotiator on behalf of member states on 
readmission agreements with third countries, granted that it is given a mandate by the 
Council to do so. The Council, on the other hand, represents the member states’ main 
channel of influence in the policy process. It has the right to make recommendations to 
legislative drafts and the power of dis/approval. The Parliament, similarly, possesses the 
competence to approve or withhold its approval for legislations. The European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), finally, is vested with the power of ruling on the compatibility of EU law 
with national law (judicial review). If called upon by individual claimants, the ECJ 
renders precedent case rulings by which national policy makers have to abide (EU law 
is supreme to national law). 
 
Transnational Exchange. A key precondition of supranational institutionalism is that 
sufficient transnational exchange (e.g. economic transactions) is present. Let us briefly 
assess the situation in our study case in this light. In terms of trade, Turkey undoubtedly 
constitutes an important business partner for the entire EU and many of its member 
states. In 2010, for instance, 46 per cent of Turkey’s exports went to EU countries and 
39 per cent of imports came from the latter (European Commission 2012). Turkey is a 
particularly important trade partner of Germany and France and the existing EU-Turkey 
Customs Union is a further indicator of close economic ties (Ülgen & Zahariadis 2004; 
Lejour & Mooij 2005, 91). Other than economic indicators, Europe is home to 
approximately four million people of Turkish descent (Eurostat 2012). That is to say, 
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the majority of Turks living abroad dwells on the European Continent. These 
individuals maintain close contacts with their relatives in Turkey such as sending of 
remittances and paying habitual family visits to the homeland (Gerdes et al. 2012). In 
the last decade or so, more and more Turkey-bound travellers have started paying visits 
to European countries as well (both for touristic and family visit purposes). The latter, 
however, unless they are holders of diplomatic passports, are subjected to visa 
restrictions. In sum, it can be said that there is considerable transnational exchange 
(both in economic and socio-political terms) between EU countries and Turkey; 
significant enough, to exert pressure upon EU actors to lift travel restrictions for 
Turkey. 
 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ has taken a particularly prominent role in 
the Turkish visa issue as well as the more general theme of freedom of movement of 
persons; it did so via the mechanism of preliminary reference rulings. The preliminary 
rulings procedure has its legal basis in Article 234 of EU law. According to this article, 
national courts shall consult the ECJ whenever they encounter a case that requires 
interpretation of Community law. In theory, it is possible for any court to refer cases to 
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, yet only courts of last instance are obliged to do so. 
The ECJ, as Slagter states, will not render a decision on the case per se, but instead 
provide a Treaty interpretation in the light of the substantive issues dealt with in any 
given case (2009, 176). Given that supranational law is supreme to national law, the 
referring national court can thereafter make its own case decision in line with EU law 
(Alter 1998). 
As mentioned earlier, Turkey is associated with the EC/EU through a set of 
international agreements most notably the Ankara Association Agreement (1963) and 
an additional protocol (1973).40 With regard to the issue of the freedom of movement of 
persons and visa restrictions, Article 41 of the protocol constitutes the main point of 
reference. The first paragraph of this article stipulates that ‘contracting parties are to 
refrain from introducing between themselves any new restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services’. This and other clauses and their 
	  
40 Dates in parantheses denote year of coming into force of the agreements. 
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potentially diverse implications have been interpreted by the ECJ in eleven court case 
rulings, one still in progress. Table 3 gives an overview. 
 
Table 3. European Court of Justice: Preliminary Reference Rulings related to the 
Freedom of Movement of Persons and Workers of Turkish Nationality 
 
 Ruling Date Case ID Case Name 
1) 1 March 2000 C-37/98 Kocak 
2) 11 May 2000 C-37/98 Savas 
3) 8 May 2003 C-171/01 Birlikte Alternative & Grüne 
GewerkschafterInnen/UG 
4) 21 October 2003 C-317/01 Abatay/Sahin 
5) 7 July 2005 C-374/03 Gürol 
6) 30 March 2006 T-367/03 Yedas Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve 
Ticaret/Council and Commission 
7) 18 July 2007 C-325/05 Derin 
8) 4 October 2007 C-349/06 Polat 
9) 11 October 2007 C-16/05 Tüm and Dari 
10) 19 February 2009 C-228/06 Soysal and Savatli 
11) 17 September 2009 C-242/06 T. Sahin vs. the Netherlands 
12) - In Progress41 - C-221/11 Demirkan 
Adapted from Gümrükcü (2012) and updated by author 
  
The ECJ’s most impactful ruling as regard visa restrictions towards Turkish nationals 
and the question whether these are lawful or not can be found in the Soysal case (C-
228/06). Therein, the European court invoked the so-called standstill clause according 
to which the re-imposition of travel restrictions after the coming into force of the 
additional protocol was impermissible. The court thereby referred to the above quoted 
Article 41. On this basis, ECJ judges ruled that Turkish nationals who wish to undertake 
short-term travels to the Schengen area must not be subjected to visa-restrictions if they 
travel in the capacity of service providers (cf. Groenendijk & Guild 2011, 18; Tezcan-
Idriz 2009). To take a concrete example, visa requirements for Turkish citizens entering 
Germany, for instance, were introduced by the eleventh modification of the Aliens Act 
(Ausländergesetz) of 1 July 1980 passed in German Parliament (Bundestag). The date 
of issuance of this law was long before the coming into force of the additional protocol 
(1 January 1973), which forbids the enactment of further restrictive measures (standstill 	  
41 At the time of writing, the Case Demirkan (C-221/11) was still in progress (date 
lodged: 22 July 2011) 
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clause). In a very similar manner, experts have argued that member states such as 
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain and Portugal are 
affected by Soysal as well.42 
The key contention with the Soysal ruling, however, lay in the fact that experts and 
authorities derived somewhat diverging interpretations as regard the term “service 
providers”. For a majority of legal scholars and lawyers the phrase entails both the 
provision (e.g. business) and reception (e.g. touristic) of services - that is to say, active 
and passive service provision. These experts base their opinion on pertinent secondary 
community law which conceptualizes both active and passive sorts of service provision 
under the same umbrella. In view of these ambiguities, several national courts (mostly 
in Germany and the Netherlands), called upon by individual litigants to clarify the 
situation, have in subsequent decisions ruled that service provision for Turkish nationals 
encompasses both active and passive forms.43 Subsequently, the European Commission, 
in an attempt to bring clarity, issued a statement that was to provide a legal basis for 
future action (Commission Recommendation C(2009) 7376). The Commission therein 
concluded that visa-free travel for Turkish nationals is (i) only applicable to Turkish 
service providers traveling to Germany and Denmark, and (ii) solely under the proviso 
that Turkish nationals go as ‘active’ service providers (thus excluding passive service 
provision such as tourism and alike). These conclusions are striking against the 
background that a plethora of legal scholars have argued differently (as elucidated 
above). 
The ECJ is currently processing a court case (Demirkan C-221/11) which is to clarify 
once and for all the definitional discrepancies between active and passive service 
provision and the question whether the notion of service provision applies to nationals 
of candidate countries as well (here Turkey). If the court should rule in the affirmative - 
that is to say, establish that both forms of service provision fall under the same umbrella 	  
42 see http://www.westphal-stoppa.de/Tuerken-Einreise.htm (Accessed on 20 February 
2013). 
 
43 German and Dutch courts have on various occasions and independent from one 
another ruled in the affirmative. For an overview see http://www.westphal-
stoppa.de/Tuerken-Einreise.htm (Accessed on 20 February 2013); see also 
http://www.europeanunionplatform.org/2012/03/15/top-dutch-administrative-court-
rules-in-favor-of-visa-free-entrance-for-turkish-businesspeople/ (Accessed 1 March 
2013). 
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and this applies to Turkish citizens as well - this would de facto open up the way for 
visa-free short-time travel for Turkish nationals.44  
 
European Commission. The European Commission assumes a key role in the 
negotiation of readmission and visa facilitation agreements with third countries. As 
noted earlier, by virtue of the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision) the 
Commission is vested with the power of drafting and initiating legislative proposals and 
negotiating agreements with third countries on behalf of member states.  
Roughly since 2002, the EU has started systematically coupling the conclusion of 
readmission agreements with visa-waiver or visa facilitation deals (Trauner & Kruse 
2008, 4). The EU’s rationale to do so emanated from increasing calls by third countries 
to provide compensating rewards (incentives) in return for taking up the obligations of 
otherwise costly readmission agreements.45 
The negotiations of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement were cumbersome and 
lengthy in comparison to those for the Western Balkan cases. Talks with Turkey were 
formally opened on 27 May 2005 in Brussels. After four unsuccessful negotiation series 
between 2005 and 2006, the talks were put on ice to be restarted no earlier than two 
years later in 2008. Turkish policy makers stance in the second round was clear and 
adamant: they asked for a visa-waiver in return for taking up the obligations of 
readmitting illegal and transit immigrants (Knaus & Stiglmayer 2012). Along with the 
obvious fact that Turkish elites believed that their country’s EU membership candidacy 
status rendered visa-restrictions for their citizens travelling to the Schengen area absurd, 
the recent lifting of visas for Western Balkan countries made the issue all the more 
pressing for Turkish policy makers. 
	  
44 What is more, If the ECJ rules in the negative, this would have severe implications 
for the legal status of Association Agreements and international agreements the EU 
concludes with third parties more generally also (in fact, such a ruling would annul their 
validity). 
 
45 As Groenendijk and Guild make clear, “Visafree travel has been made conditional on 
the fulfillment of a series of conditions, such as the introduction of biometric passports, 
a comprehensive system of border controls and the signing of a readmission agreement, 
covering not only nationals of the country but also third-country nationals that have 
transited through that country to reach the Schengen Area” (2012, 43). 
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Over the course of the second negotiation round on the readmission agreement, which 
began in 2008, representatives from the EU and Turkey achieved agreement on a draft 
that was acceptable to all parties. In February 2011, this draft found endorsement by the 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council. Approximately one year later, on 21 June 
2012, the EU and Turkey moved to initial the readmission agreement (seven years after 
the formal opening of talks). Following this period, the Commission drew out a visa 
liberalization roadmap for Turkey which it presented to the Council for approval in 
November 2012. At time of writing (June 2013) the Council was still to grant the 
Commission a mandate to initiate the visa liberalization dialogue with Turkey. This 
stalemate brings us to the next issue, the Council’s role in the process. 
 
European Council. The European Council, which is the member states’ main channel of 
influence, has played a key veto player role as regard the EU-Turkey readmission 
agreement. Notwithstanding that the EU and Turkey were ultimately able to agree upon 
a draft readmission agreement text, due to fundamental member state concerns, the 
negotiations have been arduous and long. Moreover, Turkey has not been given a visa-
waiver guarantee in return for the readmission agreement. This is a fundamental 
difference to the agreements the EU concluded with Western Balkan countries. In the 
Turkish case, the Council merely promised the opening of a “dialogue” on visa 
liberalization framing the latter “as a gradual and long term perspective” (European 
Council 2012). Turkey’s visa bid, just as its membership negotiations, has been termed 
as an open-ended process the conclusion of which ultimately resides with member 
states’ approval. Turkish authorities have reacted with discontent over these 
developments. As Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s remark reveal: 
 
We have worked with our relevant institutions and began distributing 
biometric passports in six months. We have taken crucial steps for an 
integrated border management … we have asked the EU to appoint a 
commissioner so we can begin discussing visa exemptions. They told us 
to sign the readmission agreement and that they would deal with the visa 
issue later (Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu, Cumhuriyet, 26 
November 2012). 
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After the readmission agreement was initialled by both parties in June 2012, member 
states via the Council continued to maintain an adverse stance on Turkish visa 
liberalization. This position became palpable, first and foremost, when the Council 
refrained from granting the Commission a negotiating mandate. In a rather intriguing 
inter-institutional exchange with the Commission the Council practically ignored the 
issue by stating that it took “note of the Commission's intention to initiate a dialogue on 
visa, mobility and migration with Turkey” (European Council 2011). Again, as noted 
above, the Council is yet to grant the Commission a negotiation mandate. 
Overall, the Council’s foot-dragging practices in matters related to the EU-Turkey 
readmission agreement are quite indicative of divergent preferences. Or, to be even 
more accurate, the Council’s hesitancy reflected member state concerns. Naturally, the 
question is what are these concerns? And why have they been so pronounced in matters 
related to Turkey? We shall come back to this issue in a moment when examining EU 
countries’ specific preference configurations. 
 
European Parliament. In areas where the community method governs policy-making, 
the consent of the European Parliament (EP) is required. This is stipulated by Article 
218(6)(a) of the TFEU. Before the issue is put to vote in the general assembly, 
parliamentarians are provided with voting recommendations worked out by one of the 
respective parliamentary committees. Parliamentarians more than often follow these 
recommendations when casting their votes. In the case of readmission agreements, the 
responsible working unit is the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs.  
The Committee’s draft recommendation report on the EU-Turkey readmission 
agreement, penned under the auspices of rapporteur Renate Sommer (member of the 
German Christian Democratic Party (CDU)) and published on 19 April 2013, 
recommended the Parliament to consent to the conclusion of the agreement on the 
grounds that it is crucial for solving the transit immigration problematic posed by 
Turkey. Yet, at the same time, the report was also highly critical of Turkey on a number 
of, technically speaking, general aspects which were unrelated to the issue.46 In her 	  
46 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-504.240+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN 
(Accessed 10 May 2013). 
 
 49  
report, rapporteur Renate Sommer took the liberty to criticize the Turkish government 
on general fronts such as with regard to the ongoing Cyprus problematic (where Turkey 
is blamed for deliberately not extending the EC-Ankara association agreement to 
Cyprus), and instances of governmental suppression of basic freedoms. In this regard, 
Sommer alleged Turkey of not meeting a single point of the Copenhagen Criteria. Most 
importantly, however, Sommer made a crucial factual mistake by claiming that Turkey 
made fresh demands in asking for visa facilitation before signing the readmission 
agreement; in fact Ankara has merely been asking for a parallel process – a common 
practice applied to other contracting third states as well. Sommers’ harsh language and 
insinuations understandably prompted reactions on the Turkish side. Turkey’s Chief EU 
Negotiator Egemen Bagis, for his part, responded in equally harsh tones by stating: “We 
see it as the delirium of a deputy. We don't take it seriously”.47  
Most intriguingly, only four days after the publication of the Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ draft recommendation report, rapporteur Ria 
Oomen-Ruijten from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, while not responsible for this 
topic, requested authorization to issue an opinion. In her report, dated 23 April 2013, 
Oomen-Ruijten calls upon the responsible Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs to propose that European Parliament consent to the conclusion of the EU-
Turkey readmission agreement. Whether or not this suggestion was a reaction to 
Sommer’s harsh report cannot be conclusively determined. Yet, the very circumstance 
of Oomen-Ruijten’s opinion paper being published immediately afterwards, and offered 
an account of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement matter omitting unrelated issues 
and putting right factual mistakes by Sommer, substantiates that conjecture. 
 
Discussion. The analysis of activities of the EU’s supranational institutions (ECJ, 
Commission) indicates that supranational actors seem to have had only limited 
influence in advancing the Turkish visa-liberalization process. Rather, it was member 
states who have brought their preferences to play via the Council and other mechanisms 
(COREPER committees and working groups within the Commission). As a 
consequence, the otherwise integrative European Commission has found its hands tied 
(despite the community method being in place). A European Commission Enlargement 	  
47 http://www.todayszaman.com/news-315447-ep-report-on-readmission-agreement-
harshly-criticizes-turkey.html (Accessed 12 May 2013). 
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official describes the situation as follows: “The Commission is eager to push forward 
with Turkey's visa liberalization process. However, you cannot fully disregard member 
state concerns either.” This quote is also important in that it shows that there has been a 
clear supranational policy in place on the Turkish visa issue. As for the European Court 
of Justice, despite its integration-furthering court rulings, member states strongly 
constrained the ECJ’s influence by laying out the implications and interpretations of the 
most pertinent court decision (Soysal case) in the narrowest way possible. To be sure, 
this is not to say that the ECJ is not a powerful actor. Rather, in the present case 
member state concerns were ultimately so strong, that the latter found ways to 
temporally shove aside the court ruling by delaying its implementation and tweaking 
interpretations. At the time of writing, the ECJ Demirkan case, which is to bring clarity 
to this issue once and for all, was still ongoing. This crucial court case bears the 
potential to annul extant Schengen visa restrictions for Turkish citizens. 
 
To put things into perspective, EU-readmission agreements with Western Balkan 
countries concluded two to three years earlier did not exhibit any of the peculiarities 
reported in the Turkish case. The Union lifted visa restrictions for Serbia, Macedonia 
and Montenegro in December 2009, and for Albania and Bosnia Herzegovina in 
December 2010. In all of these cases the EU granted an express and unambiguous 
guarantee of visa-lifting in return for signing the readmission agreement beforehand. 
The process was straightforward and uncomplicated. The contracting parties were 
presented visa liberalization roadmaps with reforms to be undertaken before visa-
exemption, after the implementation of which the EU introduced visa exemptions for 
those countries (Knaus & Altfudisch 2013).  
However, the lifting of short-travel visa requirements for Serbia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia resulted in an unexpected, massive surge in asylum 
claims. This occurrence can also be seen as part of the reason why EU politicians  
remained lukewarm to Turkish visa exemption because similar consequences were 
expected. Table 4 resents asylum application figures before and after the introduction of 
visa requirements for the Western Balkans and contrasts these with data on Turkish 
asylum applicants for the period 2009 to 2012. As can be seen, the number of annual 
asylum claims in the EU by Western Balkan citizens has increased by 77 per cent ever 
since the first visa-exemption agreements’ with Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro 
came into force in 2010.  
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Table 4. Asylum claims in the EU by Western Balkan and Turkish citizens (2009-2012) 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Visa Status No visa-free 
travel 
Serbia, 
Macedonia, 
Montenegro 
All five WB 
visa-free 
 
Serbia 5.460 17.740 13.980 19.065 
Macedonia 930 7.550 5.545 9.625 
Albania 2.065 1.925 3.060 7.465 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.330 2.105 2.595 5.835 
Montenegro 270 405 630 1.260 
Total 5 WB countries 
(Population 16 million; 
GDP 61 billion Euros in 
2012)  
10.055 29.725 25.810 43.250 
Turkey  
(Population 73 million; 
GDP 612 billion Euros in 
2012) 
 
7.030 
 
6.360 
 
6.455 
 
6.205 
Total Asylum Seekers in 
the EU 
266.395 260.835 303.105 335.380 
Share of WB 3.8% 11% 9% 13% 
Share of Turkey 3% 2% 2% 2% 
Sources: Adopted from European Security Initiative48 and updated with newer data 
from EUROSTAT 
 
In sum, as to why the outcome in the Turkey-EU readmission agreement case has so 
markedly differed from that of the Balkans, a convincing-enough explanation seems not 
to emerge from supranational institutionalism. The analysis of Commission and ECJ 
activities yield only limited support for the argument that supranational 
entrepreneurship decisively shaped the political outcome in the Turkish case. The 
Council was indeed the determinative player throughout the process which, as noted, 
can be seen as an indicator of the dominance of member state preferences. This 
situation, however, is rendered puzzling in view of two important background 
conditions. The Council retained an upper hand despite the fact that (i) with 
	  
48 http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=132 (Accessed 
15 June 2013) 
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readmission-visa agreements the community method governs decision-making (i.e. 
Commission and ECJ are central players in the policy process), and ii) in spite of there 
being an express supranational policy in place (the Commission’s position). This leads 
us to the next question, namely, the substantial underpinnings of state preferences on 
the issue of Turkish visa liberalization.  
 
5.2. State Preferences 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalist theory ascribes decisive causal weight to state preferences 
in the coming about of policy outcomes in the international arena. With regard to the 
issue of Turkish-visa liberalization, member states have differently conceived of 
Schengen visa liberalization for Turkey. Table 5 presents an overview of state 
preference configurations on Turkey’s visa bid.  
 
Table 5. EU Member States’ Preferences on Turkish Visa-Liberalization  
Supportive Opposed 
Italy, Sweden, Finland, 
Poland, Spain 
Germany, France, Austria, 
Netherlands, Cyprus 
Adapted from Paul (2012) and Hürriyet Daily News (6 April 2012) 
 
EU countries that have expressed support for Turkey’s visa bid are Italy, Sweden, 
Finland, Poland and Spain. Those who opposed are Germany, France, Austria, Cyprus 
and the Netherlands. For the purpose of analytical convenience, it is assumed that other 
member states have either been indifferent to the Turkish visa issue or followed 
whatever dominant position arose in the Council. With the exception of Cyprus, whose 
preference on the matter of Turkish visa liberalization can be said to have followed its 
generally antagonistic stance vis-à-vis Turkey and its EU credentials, the analysis of the 
domestic preference configurations in the other member states will help further our 
understanding of the domestic dynamics that drive immigration-related JHA politics on 
the EU level.  
In explaining divergent preferences on the matter, the ensuing analysis will proceed 
along the lines of the hypotheses mapped out in theory-chapter three. In a first step, the 
standard liberal intergovernmentalist economic interest explanation will be assessed. In 
a second step, the public opinion argument will be put under scrutiny. Then, the 
comparative country case studies will be conducted with the purpose of probing into the 
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causal mechanism at work (securitization). The section will conclude with an overall 
discussion of the findings. 
 
5.2.1. Economic Interests 
 
The standard liberal intergovernmentalist account leads us to expect that the interests of 
powerful domestic economic groups shape governmental preferences on visa policies 
with third countries. Earlier, three indicators have been identified to assessing economic 
interests of member states in lifting visa restrictions: trade, investment and tourism 
relations. Table 6 presents data on these economic indicators for selected EU countries 
and Turkey. 
Trade. In 2008, Germany, Italy and France’s exported goods to Turkey were valued at 
20.8, 10.3 and 7.4 million euros, respectively.49 These states were followed with some 
distance by the Netherlands (4.7) and Spain (4.0). Sweden, Poland, Finland and 
Austria’s exports to Turkey were significantly lower in value with 1.7, 1.7, 0.9 and 1.0 
million euros, respectively, for the same time period. It is important to note at this point 
that, due to the relatively diverse export structure across member states, average export 
share rates for a given country generally reside in the single-digit range. To put things 
into perspective, in 2011, the share of exports to Turkey for the entire EU 27 were as 
high as 4.7 per cent coming only after Russia (7 per cent), China (8.8) Switzerland (9) 
and the US (16.8) which were the EU’s top trading partners.50 
Given their considerable trade relations with Turkey, we would have expected Italy, 
Spain, Germany, France and the Netherlands to be likely candidates to support Turkey’s 
visa bid. However, only Italy and Spain did so. German, French, and Dutch policy 
positions were deviant. These findings are all the more puzzling if one considers that 
countries such as Sweden, Poland and Finland, for whom Turkey is by far not a 
significant trading partner, supported Turkish visa-exemption. Let us next examine 
investment relations. 
	  
49 Note that the table excludes the EU’s seventeen other member states for the 
pragmatic reason that those countries were largely indifferent to the Turkish visa issue. 
 
50 Figures are from EUROSTAT. 
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51 Notes: Empty cells denote unavailable data. Sources: Data compiled from respective 
member states’ statistical institutes except for outbound tourism figures (Turkish 
statistical institute), tourism share figures (EUROSTAT) and investment figures 
(UNCTAD 2012). Estimates in columns 6 and 8 are based on author’s own calculations. 
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Investment. For the period 2007-2010, the average Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
inflow to Turkey amounted to 14.761 billion USD, whereas FDI outflow from Turkey 
was 1.918 billion USD (UNCTAD 2012). In 2008, for instance, the greatest influx of 
capital to Turkey came from the Netherlands (1.343 billion USD) and Germany (1.237), 
followed by Spain (838 million USD) France (679) and Austria (586). For the same 
period, the highest amount of Turkish investments in the EU went to the Netherlands 
and Germany, with 369 and 143 million USD, respectively. With regard to FDI 
outflows from Turkey, the two EU countries that could have reaped the most benefit of 
Turkish visa liberalization are the Netherlands and Germany. These two member states, 
however, were among the fiercest opponents of Turkish visa exemption in the EU. Let 
us next look at tourism. 
 
Tourism. In 2012, over six million Turkish nationals went abroad. Turkish outbound 
Tourism was thereby highest in Bulgaria (672.874) and Greece (449.523), followed by 
Germany (385.477) and Italy (248.413).52 In comparison to that, the number of Turkish 
tourists who went to France (87.821), Austria (72.423), the Netherlands (30.469), Spain 
(22.209) and Sweden (2.446) was markedly lower. The share of Turkish tourists as part 
of total touristic arrivals was thereby highest for Germany (0.9 per cent) and Italy (0.8), 
followed by the Netherlands (0.4) and Austria (0.3). These figures must be put into 
perspective to be properly understood. The share in total touristic arrivals for a single 
country seldom exceeds a percentage figure in the single-digit range. To take the 
example of Germany, the Netherlands was the only country from which the total 
number of arrivals reached a the two-digit range number (10.6 mil. arrivals in 2011). 
For Germany, the next non-European countries in the list were the USA (4.7 per cent), 
Russia (1.8), China (1.3), Japan (1.2). Turkey’s share of touristic arrivals in Germany 
was 0.9 per cent. Since the other countries have populations exceeding 100 million 
inhabitants, Turkey’s share can be considered significant (Turkish population is about 
75 million). While in the cases of Germany, Italy, and Austria Turkish outbound 
tourism can be considered significant, only Italy has supported Turkey’s visa bid. 
Germany and Austria were opposed. 	  
52 The number of visitors who stayed in hotels was thereby high in both cases, Germany 
(143.991) and Italy (143.099). 
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Discussion. To recap, our theoretical preconception (standard liberal 
intergovernmentalist account) would have led us to expect EU countries with economic 
incentives to be supportive of Turkish visa liberalization. The discussion of trade, 
investment and tourism relations between the EU and Turkey, however, does not yield 
satisfactory support for this argument. Germany, France, and the Netherlands would 
have all had (although to varying degrees) economic incentives to support Turkish visa 
exemption. They did, however, oppose lifting visa restrictions. Only Italy (significant 
trade and tourism relations) and Spain (significant trade incentives) have supported 
Turkish visa exemption. 
The cases of Sweden, Finland and Poland constitute another critical puzzle from the 
conventional LI perspective. None of these member states could have promised itself 
substantial economic gains from Turkish visa-liberalization. Yet, their governments 
have expressed support for Turkey’s visa bid all throughout. One plausible explanation 
for these countries’ preferences may lie in their generally positive attitude towards 
Turkey and its EU credentials. High profile Swedish, Finish and Polish politicians have 
on various occasions buttressed their support for Turkey throughout the latter’s EU 
membership accession process. To state an illustrative quote by Finish PM Katainen: “if 
Turkey was an EU member, the current situation [economic crisis] in Europe could 
have been slightly different.”53   
The puzzle becomes all the more striking if one considers international business 
association’s viewpoints on the matter. For instance, Vice President of the French 
Business Confederation Thierry Courtaigne stated: “Visa liberalization is a first and 
simple step that will leverage the European growth potential, from Lisboa to 
Vladivostok, and bring mutual advantages to all countries and all partners, private 
sector as well as governments!” In a similar manner, Eckhard Cordes, Chairman of the 
German Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations, gave to protocol: “Visa 
barriers constrain investment and produces red tape costing hundreds of millions of 
	  
53 http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/11/news/sweden.php (accessed 20 April 2013), 
http://www.trt-world.com/trtworld/en/newsdetail.aspx?haberkodu=a6e61e68-3c6d-
4733-afa7-05e6634bc2d1 (Accessed 20 April 2013), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/7402536.html (Accessed 20 April 
2013). 
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Euros per annum. We have no time to lose as regards the weak economic growth in 
Europe at the moment.”54   
Given that economic incentives ultimately seem not to have mattered as regard the 
Turkey-EU readmission visa agreement, what other dynamics could have driven these 
countries’ preferences on Turkish visa liberalization? A high-ranking German diplomat 
gives a crucial hint in this respect: “Yes, you [Turkey] are right [in demanding visa 
liberalization]. But it’s very difficult for us to convince our public.”55 This leads us to 
the next question, namely, the role of public opinion as a determinant of member state 
preferences on readmission-visa agreements. 
 
5.2.2. Public Opinion  
 
Since political elites care about their survival in office, and in democratic regimes this is 
typically sought through reelection, electoral constituencies can be seen as a key player 
in the domestic preference formation process. Far from being an automatic mechanism, 
though, the prospect that European elites take into account public sentiments when 
engaging in JHA policy-making is thought to hinge upon whether an issue is 
securitized. To begin with, we first need to establish how EU citizens’ feel about easing 
travel for third country nationals. A recent Eurobarometer survey (76.4) from 2011 
quite conveniently contains a survey questions that probes into this question.56 The item 
reads as follows: 
 
• “Some people think that it should be easier for non-EU citizens to travel to the 
EU for business or tourism”.57  
	  
54 http://www.ost-ausschuss.de/economic-growth-instead-visa-barriers (Accessed 14 
May 2013). 
 
55 http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=303205 
(Accessed 10 April 2013). 
 
56  The Eurobarometer is a survey periodically conducted on behalf of the European 
Commission. The Eurobarometer 76.4 was a special issue designed to assess EU 
citizens’ attitudes on justice and home affairs policies, in particular. 
 
57 Response choices on this item were as follows: totally agree/totally disagree/don’t 
know. For the purpose of facilitating analysis, the latter category (“don’t know”) will be 	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Figure 3 presents statistics on this survey question. On the most general level, it can be 
said that public opinion on this item exhibited marked variation across member states. 
The data shows the highest approval rates for Poland (78 per cent approval), followed 
by Spain (66 per cent), Italy (64 per cent), Sweden (60 per cent) and Finland (51 per 
cent). Other publics such as those in France (47 per cent approval), Germany (47 per 
cent), Austria (45 per cent) and the Netherlands (46 per cent) were rather opposed to the 
idea of easing travel for third country nationals coming to the EU. Last but not least, the 
EU27 average showed overall approving stances (57 per cent).58 
 
Most important, though, the data points at a high level of convergence between public 
opinion on travel easement and governmental preferences on visa liberalization for 
Turkish citizens (Table 7). In particular, this convergence applies to Austria and the 
Netherlands and to a less stronger extent, France and Germany. These countries’ public 
stances (rather opposed to easing travel for third country nationals) coincided with 
adverse governmental preferences on the issue of Turkish visa liberalization. The 
pressing question thus reads: why have political elites in these countries attended to 
public opinion despite lacking domestic ratification mechanisms (e.g. referenda), 
without which they were not obliged to do so? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
omitted in the discussion. 
 
58 For a comparison with data on EU citizens’ attitudes on intra-EU travel without 
borders see Appendix 2. 
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Figure 3. Public Opinion on Travel Easement for non-EU citizens, selected 
member states 
 
 
 
Table 7. State Preferences on Turkish Visa Liberalization and Public Opinion on Travel 
Easement for non-EU citizens 
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5.2.2.1. Triggering Mechanism: Securitization59 
 
Our theoretical preconception leads us to assume that securitization brings public 
opinion to matter as a determinant of state preferences. That is to say, where an issue is 
framed in terms of a security and policing discourse, public sentiments trump economic 
interests. For probing into this issue, the main contours of political debate shall be 
examined in four member state case studies. These are Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands, and Italy. 60  Since we are interested in learning about the domestic 
dynamics that have driven a specific policy outcome on the EU level (Turkish visa 
liberalization), the former three cases, having exhibited a negative outcome on the 
dependent variable (opposed Turkey’s visa bid), are of paramount interest. However, in 
order not to select on the dependent variable the analysis will be complemented by a 
contrasting case study of Italy. Taken together, the four comparative case studies will 
help strengthen confidence in our findings and increase inferential leverage for drawing 
out theoretical generalizations.  
 
Germany. In Germany, the Turkish visa issue has been made subject to extensive 
parliamentary and public debate. The issue was first brought to debate by the leftist 
party (DIE LINKE) in 2009.61 Following the ECJ’s Soysal ruling (elaborated upon in 
section 5.1), the party lodged a parliamentary interpellation [kleine Anfrage] to bring to 
light the implications of the ECJ court case for Germany. The conservative CDU-FDP 
coalition government’s response to the inquiry was highly limited in both scope and 
content. The government’s rejoinder largely dwelt upon the distinction between active 
and passive service provision (advanced by a small group of legalists as described 
above) in order to argue that the implications of the Soysal case ruling solely entitled 	  
59 Parts of the ensuing empirical analysis are taken from a previous paper by the author 
analyzing the mechanism of securitization (Baysan 2013). 
 
60 Study cases were selected on the basis of two criteria; 1)  regime types (Germany and 
Austria with assimilative immigrant integration policies, and the Netherlands with a 
multicultural mode of immigrant incorporation) and 2) data availability/richness 
(arguably, a more pragmatic consideration). 
 
61Bundestag Drucksache 16/12562, URL: 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/125/1612562.pdf (Accessed on 15 February 
2013). 
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Turkish lorry drivers to visa-free travel to the Schengen area. A year later, in 2010, the 
Green Party, dissatisfied with the government’s dealing with the issue, handed in a 
petition urging the latter comply with the ECJ’s ruling, and to push for a visa-
liberalization for Turkey on the EU level. The governing coalition ultimately voted 
down the request in Parliament. CDU spokesman Reinhard Grindel justified the 
government’s decision on the grounds that a Turkish visa-waiver would cause massive 
illegal immigrations to Germany and, as a corollary, aggravate domestic integration 
problems. His statement in parliament read as follows: 
 
We put the integration of foreigners living here on the centre stage [...] 
this pertains particularly to those […] who have been living here for 
many years but have so far made little use of our integration offers. [...] 
Visa exemption for Turkish nationals can lead to a dramatic increase in 
uncontrolled immigration to Germany. In consequence, this means: Visa-
free travel for Turkish nationals aggravates integration problems. We 
reject it (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010; Reinhard Grindel CDU).62 
 
In 2012, Minister of Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich reiterated his government’s position 
by stating that general visa-liberalization for Turkey is not feasible because he, as the 
responsible minister, has to “keep security risks in mind”. To be sure, the purported 
security risk which Friedrich alludes to is the socially constructed threat of illegal 
immigration that Turkey is said to pose to the EU.63 Illegal immigration is thereby used 
to describe the overstaying of short-term travel visas. In the case of Germany, the 
specifics of its national context are likely to have facilitated the securitization of the 
Turkish visa issue. Indeed, both Grindel and Friedrich’s speeches embody vague 
language based on beliefs that are assumed to be common in society (see Salter & Piche 
2011, 936). In particular, it is the postulation that Turkish citizens do pose a threat of 
illegal immigration for Germany, and the belief that many Turkish immigrants are not 
adequately integrated into German society (Schaefer et al. 2005, 1) which form 	  
62 Translated by author 
 
63 http://www.saarbruecker-
zeitung.de/aufmacher/berliner_buero/art182516,4523479#.UVFkG1spYyA (Accessed 
on 30 May 2013) 
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important contextual peculiarities in the German case. An additional demographic 
element lies in the fact that more two and a half-million Turkey-origin immigrants are 
dwelling in Germany (see Appendix 2), making the latter effectively home to the largest 
Turkish ethnic community living outside the Turkish homeland. Taken together, these 
contextual specifics are likely to have raised the political saliency of the visa issue 
(network migration theory expects migratory movements where there is already an 
established group of settlers; this phenomenon is called “chain migration”) and 
therewith facilitated the securitization of Turkish visa liberalization. 
 
Austria. In Austria, by contrast, there has not been any comparable parliamentary 
debate on the Turkish Schengen visa issue.64 Neither has there been a reaction to the 
ECJ Soysal ruling. The Turkish visa issue has mostly been dealt with on the level of the 
Ministry of Interior – the ministers of which also hold the JHA Councils on the issue in 
the EU. In 2012, following a bid by Christoph Leitl the president of the Austrian 
Chamber of Commerce to lift visa-restrictions for Russian and Turkish travellers as a 
means to boost economic relations, Minister of Interior Johanna Mikl-Leitner from the 
conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) responded with a resolute “that’s out of 
question”.65 On this score, Johanna Mikl-Leitner has been very much on the same page 
as her German counterpart Hans-Peter Friedrich. Both have on various occasions 
uttered their opposition to Turkish visa-exemption on the grounds that it would cause 
massive illegal immigration.66 More recently, also, Mikl-Leitner joined a group of 
European elites in a petition to the European Commission urging the examination of the 
possibility of a suspension clause for visa-exemptions already given to some Balkan 	  
64 An interesting phenomenon is that Austrian deputies have recently handed in a 
parliamentary interpellation asking about the reasons why Turkey has visa-restrictions 
in place for Austrian citizens but not, for instance, for German or Swiss nationals (see 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/J/J_10133/fname_238562.pdf 
(Accessed 10 March 2013).  
 
65 Tiroler Tageszeitung, 4 November 2012, URL: 
http://www.tt.com/%C3%9Cberblick/Wirtschaft/Wirtschaft%C3%96sterreich/5508746-
42/leitl-f%C3%BCr-visa-freiheit-von-russen-und-t%C3%BCrken.csp (Accessed 15 
March 2013). 
 
66 This assessment has been dealt with at length in section two and refuting evidence 
has been presented. URL: http://kurier.at/politik/tuerkei-will-visafreiheit-fuer-mehr-
grenzschutz/770.435 (Accessed 20 March 2013 
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countries (particularly Serbia, Macedonia, Rumania).67 It is thereby important to note 
that both Austria’s Mikl-Leitner and Germany’s Friedrich barely made an effort to 
differentiate between the immigration of third country nationals via Turkey through the 
Turkish-Greek border (transit migrants) and Turkish citizens moving to EU countries. 
This is an important distinction to make as the number of transit migrants passing 
through Turkey is exponentially higher.68 Yet, the abolishment of short-term travel 
Schengen visas for Turkish citizens is recurrently lumped together with the topic of 
illegal immigration. This confusion all the more fortifies the purported migratory threat 
argument.69 In the case of Austria, the potentially facilitating role of the national context 
is important to note as well. Quite similar to Germany, Austria harbours a politically 
salient Turkish ethnic community. In fact, Austria is home to the fourth largest Turkish 
ethnic group in Europe with around 200 thousand people of Turkish origin dwelling 
there (see Appendix 2). This demographic fact, together with a deeply-entrenched 
historical rivalry vis-à-vis Turkey (this is epitomized by two Ottoman sieges of Vienna 
in 1529 and 1683) are contextual elements that may have been to prone to have 
facilitated the securitization of the issue of Turkish visa-free travel. 
 
The Netherlands. In the Netherlands, political debate on the Turkish visa issue ensued 
following the ECJ’s Soysal ruling on the matter (similar to Germany). A national court 
in Haarlem, following up the EU courts’ judgement, had ruled that Turkish service 
providers could travel visa-free to the Netherlands (like a number of other German 
courts did as well). On the part of the elites, Minister of Immigration and Asylum Geerd 
Leers announced that he would appeal the ruling: “EU court ruling does not affect the 
Netherlands. The ruling in Haarlem goes against our principles”.70 Reportedly, an 	  
67 http://www.krone.at/Oesterreich/Asyl_Mikl-
Leitner_fuer_Aufhebung_der_Visafreiheit-Balkan_im_Visier-Story-338743 (Accessed 
20 March 2013). 
 
68 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/world/europe/illegal-immigrants-slip-into-
europe-by-way-of-greek-border.html?_r=0 (Accessed 10 March 2013). 
 
69 http://derstandard.at/1331206756124/Druck-auf-Griechenland-Oesterreich-
schmiedet-Allianz-gegen-illegale-Migration (Accessed 27 March 2013). 
 
70 http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2011/02/17/geen-visumplicht-voor-turken-die-naar-
nederland-reizen/ (Accessed 27 February 2013). 
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“emergency debate” took place in a committee immediately after the announcement of 
the ECJ ruling in March 2009.71 Maxime Verhagen, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 
regard the Turkish visa, issue is blamed as follows by a newspaper headline: “There 
will be a tsunami of Turks and that is the fault of Verhagen”.72 Other than that, much of 
the securitization debate in the Netherlands has unfolded on the ministerial level and in 
closed discussions within the country’s political apparatus. Media reports of 
‘emergency debates’ held on the issue of Turkish visa-exemption are an important 
indicator of this. As regard contextual factors, such as those related to Germany and 
Austria, the Netherlands harbours a significant amount of Turkish immigrants. In 
particular, Dutch society is host to the third largest Turkish diaspora in Europe (after 
Germany and France) with approximately 270 thousand people of Turkish origin living 
in the Netherlands (See Appendix 2). With similar worries about illegal immigration as 
in Germany and Austria, these contextual specifics are likely to have been facilitating 
conditions for the securitization of the issue of Turkish visa liberalization in the 
Netherlands as well. 
 
Italy. The debate on the issue of Turkish visa liberalization in Italy unfolded quite 
differently compared to the other EU countries. Most important, there were no traits of 
securitization; the debate was largely based on economic considerations. High profile 
Italian political elites have repeatedly expressed their support for Turkey’s visa bid. For 
instance, in June 2010, members of the group of the People of Freedom handed in a 
parliamentary interpellation inquiring in the reasons of ongoing visa restrictions towards 
Turkey. In their questionnaire they argued that these were running counter substantial 
trade and tourism interests between Italy and Turkey. 73  The Italian government 
responded to the inquiry by pointing out that EU visa policy is under Community 
competence but that Italian authorities would on this note do the best they could within 
the responsible Justice and Home Affairs Council. Subsuming the Italian Government’s 	  
71 http://www.publiekrechtenpolitiek.nl/visumplicht-voor-turkse-zelfstandigen-en-
artikel-94-grondwet/ (Accessed 15 February 2013). 
 
72 http://www.welingelichtekringen.nl/politiek/29436/er-komt-een-tsunami-van-turken-
en-dat-is-de-schuld-van-verhagen.html (Accessed 20 February 2013). 
 
73http://banchedati.camera.it/sindacatoispettivo_16/showXhtml.Asp?idAtto=26773&stil
e=6&highLight=1 (Accessed 10 May 2013). 
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stance, in a written statemen its Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave to protocol: “Italy has 
argued for the start of this route [visa liberalization], as part of the overall dialogue with 
Turkey.” (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010).74  In a similar manner, Italian 
Minister of Interior Giuliano Amato, during a visit in Ankara in 2011, reiterated his 
government’s supportive stance on Turkish visa liberalization by saying that “it is unfair 
that I come here freely but you can't.”75 As regard potentially facilitating contextual 
factors, Italy does for instance not harbor a politically salient or demographically 
significant Turkish diaspora (as in Germany, Austria, France and the Netherlands). Nor 
are there any deeply-engrained historical rivalries between Turkey and Italy (as is the 
case with Austria). In sum, there were no conditions present in the Italian case that 
could have posed a favorable environment for the securitization of the issue of Turkish 
visa liberalization. As a result, economic interests can be said to have dominated the 
process. 
 
Similar patterns apply to other EU countries as well. For instance, in the cases of Poland 
and Sweden the issue of Turkish visa-liberalization has not been portrayed as a security 
threat either; in these cases the matter was even far from being politicized. Conversely, 
in the instance of France, patterns similar to those reported in the Dutch case can be 
pointed out with a securitization process largely revolving on the ministerial level. The 
severity of this security discourse was particularly strong during “Turcosceptic” 
President Nicolas Sarkozy’s term in office but has notably decreased with the coming 
into power of socialist party leader Francois Hollande in May 2012. Indeed, this 
alteration may be ascribed to the fact that Hollande pondered to a different electoral 
constituency than conservative leader Sarkozy did. The change in power in France 
surely is part of the story why the Council, in November 2012, was able to acquiesce to 
the visa roadmap for Turkey proposed by the Commission. 
For the findings to be further bolstered, the following counterfactual question merits 
brief consideration: if it were not for securitization, what other dynamic could have 
possibly triggered governments to take into consideration domestic sentiments and, in 	  
74http://banchedati.camera.it/sindacatoispettivo_16/showXhtml.Asp?idAtto=26773&stil
e=6&highLight=1 (Accessed 10 May 2013). 
 
75 http://www.todayszaman.com/news-244813-italian-minister-amato-defends-visa-
free-travel-to-europe-for-turkish-citizens.html (Accessed 10 May 2013). 
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consequence, oppose easing travel for Turkish nationals on the EU level? One 
conceivable counter-argument would lie in positing that adverse stances stemmed from 
political elites’ individual antagonisms. This would imply that negative public opinion 
merely coincided with elites’ positions. Then, however, the question is what other 
motivation elites could have pursued with making opposition to Turkey’s visa bid if not 
to pander to their electoral constituencies? Any motivation other than the latter, 
however, would strictly speaking not fit into a rational behavioral pattern, and is 
therefore dismissible in the present context.76 
 
5.2.2.2. Threat Perceptions: Material and Ideational Dimensions 
  
Having empirically analyzed how securitization works as a mechanism actuating public 
opinion, the next task lies in pinpointing the nature of threat perceptions (material 
and/or ideational) underpinning domestic sentiments (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). Probing 
into this matter will yield additional insights into an auxiliary question posed earlier, 
namely, whether elites respond to public attitudes or whether public stances influence 
elite behavior.  
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is important to note the issue of travel easement 
(visa liberalization) is closely connected with the broader theme of immigration 
(mobility-immigration nexus). The reason for this is that visa liberalization is regularly 
equated with the threat of illegal immigration (Baysan 2013). This has been confirmed 
once again in recent debates on Bulgaria and Romania’s impending joining of the 
Schengen area where some EU ministers have joined forces to block the two countries’ 
entry on the grounds that they posed a threat (massive influx of illegal immigrants and 
individuals intending to abuse EU countries’ social welfare systems). A remark made 
by German Minister of Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich in early March 2013 is illustrative 
of this attitude: “There is no problem when people are coming to Germany for work, 
that's what we want in Europe, but we don't want people coming only to have social 
security”.77  
	  
76 Note here the present theoretical framework is based on the rationality assumption.  
 
77 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21653092 (Accessed 1 May 2013). 
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Given that the primary issue that comes up in debates on lifting visa-restrictions is 
illegal immigration (or criminally motivated cross-border movements for that matter) it 
is meaningful to probe into EU citizens’ sentiments on the topic of immigration, broadly 
construed.78 Correspondingly, the following analysis will draw upon survey results by 
the European Values Study (EVS) which has inquired into public attitudes on, inter alia, 
economic and cultural aspects of immigration. As has been explicated elsewhere 
(McLaren 2006), when EU citizens respond to questions related to immigration or 
ethnic communities in contemporary surveys, they almost invariably refer to post-
World War II (labor) immigrants. It is important to note that, in Western Europe, 
immigrants of Turkish origin make up by far the largest ethnic group. It seems thus 
reasonable to expect participants to refer to the Turkish diaspora when responding to the 
survey question on immigration – this surely constitutes an advantage in the present 
context.79  
 
Group-Conflict Hypothesis. The group-conflict hypothesis holds that public opinion on 
immigration and ethnic groups is shaped by threat perceptions over domestic economic 
resources. The European Values Study (2008 edition) survey series contains two useful 
indicators for exploring the veracity of this hypothesis in the present context: 
 
• “Immigrants take away jobs from natives in a country” (indicator 1) 
• “Immigrants are a strain on a country’s welfare system” (indicator 2) 
 
For these two survey items, respondents were asked to position themselves on a ten-
point scale where 1 equals complete agreement and 10 complete disagreement with the 
statement. Technically speaking, a positioning between 1 to 5 can be subsumed to 
indicate different degree of agreement with the phrase, whereas a placement between 5 
to 10 denotes different degrees of disagreement. For the purpose of facilitating analysis, 
the following discussion draws upon the accumulative percentage values a country 	  
78 Also, there exist no express surveys addressing the issue of immigration from Turkey 
anyway. 
 
79 It follows that when individuals in countries such as Germany or Austria respond to 
immigration-related questions they are likely to relate to the Turkish diaspora. It should 
be noted, though, that this does neither apply to southern European states such as Spain 
or Italy nor to Eastern European countries such as Poland.  
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obtains when adding up the proportion of people who have indicated some degree of 
agreement with the statement at hand (i.e. responses 1 to 5 on the scale). 
 
Indicator 1. Figure 4 presents data on the survey question whether “immigrants take 
away jobs from natives in a country” (see Appendix 4 for more detail).  It appears that 
Austrian and German publics exhibited by far the highest levels of agreement with this 
statement (accumulative score of responses between 1 to 5) with 69.3 and 68.8 per cent, 
respectively. That is to say, more than two thirds of Austrian and German nationals 
agreed that immigrants take away their jobs. Next in the list come Spain (56 per cent) 
Poland (54.6 per cent), and Italy (50.8 per cent) whose publics exhibited lower levels of 
agreement. These countries are followed by France, the Netherlands, Finland, and 
Sweden, where approval were lower in comparison to the others with 48.3 and 45.4, 40 
and 30 per cent, respectively.  
 
Indicator 2. Figure 5 presents survey results on the second indicator whether 
“immigrants are a strain on a country’s welfare system.” (see also Appendix 4). It turns 
out that the German and Austrian publics maintained the highest degree of agreement 
with the statement (accumulative score of responses between 1 to 5) with 82.3 and 79 
per cent, respectively - recall that these two countries exhibited the highest approval 
rates on indicator 1 as well (immigrants take away jobs from natives). Next in line come 
Finland, France, Poland and the Netherlands with accumulative scores of 65.8, 64.8, 61 
and 61 per cent, respectively, followed by Italy, Spain and Sweden who exhibited the 
lowest approval rates (54.7, 50.7 and 49 per cent, respectively). 
 
Symbolic-Politics Hypothesis. The symbolic-politics hypothesis posits that holds that 
public opinion on immigration and ethnic groups is shaped by ideational threat 
perceptions over issues such as national identity, culture and the “way of life”. The 
European Values Study (2008 edition) contains two survey questions that lend 
themselves for probing into the veracity of this hypothesis: 
 
• “A country’s cultural life is undermined by immigrants” (indicator 1) 
• “Because of the number of immigrants, I sometimes feel like a stranger” 
(indicator 2) 
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For the first item (indicator 1), respondents were asked to position themselves on a ten-
point scale where 1 denotes full agreement and 10 full disagreement with the statement. 
In the ensuing discussion, for the purpose of facilitating analysis, the accumulative 
score of the percentage of people who have indicated some degree of agreement with 
the statement at hand (i.e. responses 1 to 5 on the scale) is computed to form the basis of 
discussion. For the second item (indicator 2), participants were asked to indicate their 
opinion on the statement on a five-point scale (ranging from 1. agree strongly, 2. agree, 
3. neither agree nor disagree, 4. disagree, to 5. disagree strongly). In the subsequent 
discussion, responses indicating some form of agreement (i.e. (1) agree strongly and (2) 
agree) are subsumed to form an aggregate score for the purpose of analytical 
convenience.  
 
Indicator 1. The first measure to assess symbolic threat perceptions is the survey 
question whether “a country’s cultural life is undermined by immigrants.” Figure 6 
presents the descriptive statistics on this item (see Appendix 5 for more detail). Austrian 
and German publics exhibited by far the highest rates of approval (accumulative score 
responses 1 to 5) with this statement with 66.8 and 61 per cent, respectively. These two 
countries are followed by France (47.8 per cent) and the Netherlands (46.6 per cent). 
Slightly lower levels of agreement with the survey question were reported for Italy 
(43.7 per cent) and Spain (42 per cent), with Poland, Sweden and Finland making up the 
bottom of the list with accumulative approval rates as low as 35.8, 35.6, and 27.9 per 
cent, respectively. 
 
Indicator 2. The second item measuring ideational threat perceptions is the following 
question: “because of the number of immigrants, I sometimes feel like a stranger.” 
Figure 7 presents the survey statistics (see also Appendix 5). The Austrian public leads 
on this item by a wide margin with an approval rate (accumulative score of response 1 
and 2) of 50.9 per cent. Austria is followed by France (30.9 per cent), Spain (29.7), 
Germany (28.6), the Netherlands (27) and Italy (27.3) with considerably lower rates. At 
the bottom of the list are Sweden, Finland, and Poland with agreement rates of 23.4, 
17.5, and 11.2 per cent, respectively. 
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Source:  European V
alues Study (2008) 
Figure 4. Im
m
igrants take aw
ay jobs (group-conflict hypothesis indicator 1) 
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Figure 6. Im
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ine country's cultural life (sym
bolic-politics hypothesis indicator 1) 
Source:  European V
alues Study (2008) 
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Correlation. Having inspected the descriptive statistics of each of the group-conflict and 
symbolic-politics indicators, the next task lies in examining their relationship with 
public opinion on travel easement for non-EU nationals. To this end, an index score is 
computed for each hypothesis by taking the mean value of the indicators. The index 
scores are correlated with public opinion data. Figures 8 and 9 present the results. 
 
On the most general level, it can be seen that public opinion on travel easement for non-
EU citizens seem to be stronger correlated with symbolic threat perceptions (r=0.54) 
than with economic threat perceptions (r= 0.39). This is a rather intriguing finding (with 
the caveat though that these results must be seen as tentative).80 On the member state 
level, it turns out for Austria and Germany both economic and symbolic threat 
perceptions were strongly associated with public opinion on immigration. This 
relationship, although less pronounced, appears to hold in the cases of France and the 
Netherlands as well. The fact that these countries’ governments were also opposed 
Turkish visa liberalization may be indicative of an eclectic base of threat perceptions 
made up of material and ideational components. 
The same relationship, however, appears not to be present in the case of Italy and Spain. 
In the latter, we see relatively high economic and symbolic threat perceptions, yet 
surprisingly, neither Italian nor Spanish publics have opposed travel easement for third 
state nationals. This differential outcome could be ascribed to the absence of a 
constructed link between cross-border mobility and illegal immigration in these 
instances. A plausible explanation as to why this linkage has not been constructed in 
Italy and Spain could be found in the absence of securitization.  
 
Overall, if there was a tentative inference to be drawn from the findings presented 
above, both material and ideational threat perceptions appear to account for the variance 
in public opinion on the issue of travel easement for third country nationals. Future 
research should follow up and inquire into this question in a more comprehensive 
manner. 
	  
80 The sample drawn upon herein neither large enough nor randomized to allow for 
making confident conclusions on this question. The issue is certainly worth pursuing 
further in future research. 
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Figure 8. Relation between Public Opinion on Travel Easement and Economic 
Threat Perceptions on Immigration 
Figure 9. Relation between Public Opinion on Travel Easement and Symbolic 
Threat Perceptions on Immigration 
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Discussion. Earlier, we have derived a set of empirical predictions on where and under 
what conditions the group-conflict (economic threat perceptions) and symbolic politics 
(ideational threat perceptions) hypotheses would be most likely to hold. We expected in 
particular that 
 
• economic threat perceptions to be particularly pronounced in member states 
which maintain higher levels of social spending and/or harbor a significant 
and/or politically salient Turkish immigrant population, and 
• ideational threat perceptions to be particularly pronounced in EU countries 
which harbor a significant and/or politically salient Turkish immigrant 
population.  
 
To what extent have these expectations been accurate? As regard economic threat 
perceptions, looking at EU countries’ social spending figures yields quite corroborative 
evidence to our conjecture. Member states with high economic threat perceptions such 
as Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Finland, France and Italy as stated above, also 
maintain high social security expenditures (in PPS, purchasing power standards). These 
are evidently above the EU27 average level of 6604 PPS for 2008.81 Among these 
countries, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Austria were also those who harbor 
the largest Turkish immigrant community in Europe (see Appendix 2) 
As regard symbolic threat perceptions, quite similar observations can be stated. Again, 
symbolic threat perceptions are particularly pronounced in the cases of Germany, 
France, the Netherlands and Austria. These are states with both a politically and 
demographically significant Turkish population (see Appendix 2). Together these 
countries harbor more than 90 per cent of all Turkish immigrants living in Europe, with 
Germany having the biggest Turkish diaspora (2.6 mil.) followed by France (370 tsd.), 
the Netherlands (270 tsd.) and Austria (200tsd.). By and large, it can be said that our 
theoretical expectations show a good deal of match with the empirical data.  	  
81http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/images/9/9c/Expenditure_on_soci
al_protection_in_PPS_per_capita_in_2008.PNG; figures on social spending in terms of 
purchasing power standards (PPS) are said to be the best indicator to compare social 
welfare expenditures across member states because they factor in the national level of 
wealth 
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5.3. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has probed into the veracity of liberal intergovernmentalist (economic 
interest and public opinion based explanations) and supranational institutionalist 
accounts towards understanding the differential Turkey-EU readmission-visa agreement 
outcome. The empirical analysis laid bare that domestic societal preferences in the form 
of public opinion has largely shaped government positions on the issue of Turkish visa 
liberalization. 
More specifically, some member states (most notably Germany and France), despite 
facing palpable economic incentives to liberalize their visa regime with Turkey, have 
opposed Turkish visa liberalization. This stance has been shown to emanate from the 
securitization of the Turkish visa issue in their domestic arenas. Security-framing logic 
(i.e. securitization) thereby moved the Turkish visa issue from low politics to the 
domain of high politics (making it a matter of concern for national security and 
survival). As a result, public sentiments trumped economic interests as the basis of 
governmental preference configurations. A European Commission enlargement official 
lucidly summarizes the political nature of the quarrel over the issue of Turkish visa 
liberalization: “visa does not protect against immigration, nor against crimes … I think 
it is more a political issue and I think it is high time to do something about it” 
(Commission Enlargement official, personal communication, 23 April 2012). 
 
These being the general findings of the preceding analysis, a last topic that merits 
exploration concerns the real-world implications of the EU’s ongoing restrictive visa 
regime towards Turkey. Of paramount interest in this regard are Schengen states visa 
issuing practices vis-à-vis Turkish nationals as taking place within consulates and 
embassies. In view of the political securitization of the Turkish visa issue, as examined 
above, the pressing question is whether there is a similar security-logic present in the 
workings of bureaucrats and security officials as well (bureaucratic securitization). I 
shall inquire into this question on the following pages. 
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5.4. Restrictive EU Visa Policy And Its Real-World Implications: Schengen States’ 
Visa Issuing Practices Towards Turkish Nationals 
 
 
Border control has attained a profoundly new quality in the last couple of decades. 
Control over entrants to a country, as Salter states, is now exercised way “before they 
arrive at the border” (Salter 2008, 73). As a result, control has become “much less 
visible than police working on the front lines of border control” (Bigo 2006, 21). These 
new modalities have effectively put visa officials in the position of “protecting’ their 
country from individuals ‘who come from … problem countries” (Whyte 2008, 143f.). 
Turkey, by virtue of being placed on the Schengen visa blacklist (Council Regulation 
539/2001) constitutes a “problem country” for the EU. Turkish citizens are held to 
obtain visas before traveling to the Schengen area – a process that has reportedly been 
plagued by in-transparency and arbitrariness (Baysan 2013, 11).  
In an attempt to counter-act discretionary practices within Schengen consulates, the EU 
has put into force a set of regulations among which are the Common Consular 
Instructions, the Schengen Border Handbook, and most recently, the Visa Code. While 
these regulations were enacted to harmonize visa-issuing practices across member 
states, empirical work indicates that a genuine harmonization across member states has 
not been achieved, yet EU regulations, so Boratyński et al. (2006), have not affected 
decision-making rules but merely explicated procedural and technical issues of the visa 
lodging process (e.g. scope and the nature of required documents). As a result, national 
authorities go about their own way of evaluating visa applications. A visa official 
describes the current situation as follows: “Schengen is a bunch of countries which 
share a common visa sticker, but which follow their own national visa policies” 
(National Visa Official, cited in Woon 2007, 29). 
How does the situation look in the Turkish case? Insights from recent fieldwork carried 
out by the Turkey-based Economic Development Foundation [Iktisadi Kalkinma Vakfi, 
hereonafter: IKV] lends further support to the argument that Schengen visa issuing 
practices are subject to considerable national variation (Economic Development 
Foundation 2010). The IKV, who has interviewed Turkish citizens about their Schengen 
visa application experiences, reports that a majority of the study participants have raised 
complaints against highly in-transparent visa-issuing practices of Schengen authorities. 
Most of the individuals were complaining against German and Belgian visa authorities’ 
practices. Among the most frequently raised problems were that consular officials 
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demanded extra documents and/or disproportionally high amounts of money on 
applicants’ bank accounts (as a guarantee of their return intentions). Further, 63 per cent 
of the survey participants reported instances where their visa appeal had been rejected 
without/or only with unsatisfactory disclosure of refusal grounds. The latter problem 
has been reported for Schengen consulates in other contexts as well (see Boratyński et 
al., 2006).  
Latest field reports suggest that certain Schengen consulates (e.g. Germany, the 
Netherlands and Italy) have begun entrusting intermediary agencies with the processing 
of the formal stage of the visa application procedure (Deutsches Konsulat Istanbul, 
2012). Due to the actual visa application process being outsourced to private agencies, 
individuals no longer engage in face-to-face contact with consular officials. One 
consequence of this new regulation is that applicants are now confronted with additional 
application fees (intermediaries charge about €20 extra). The increased fee, however, 
constitutes only a minor aspect of the novel situation. More important is the question 
whether outsourcing (in other words, the abolishment of direct contact between consular 
officials and visa applicants) effectually exacerbates the problem of discretionary 
practices. In principal two rationales seem conceivable for outsourcing the visa-issuing 
process: one reason is technical and meant to increase administrative capacity; the other 
reason is pragmatic and premised on the idea of “scapegoating” insofar as the 
interposition of an intermediary unit is to serve the very purpose of diverting critique 
and complaints by individual applicants. In cases where visa-issuing practices have 
been reported to be problematic, it would appear only reasonable to outsource. 
Another problem with current national visa policies lies in the inconsistent application 
of extant EU regulations. For instance, individuals who are in principle eligible for a 
visa-exemption as service providers going to Denmark or Germany (according to 
Soysal C-228/06) still face hurdles in attaining a visa-exemption documents. Although 
officially exempted from visa-restrictions, service providers need to apply for a 
certificate confirming their visa-free status, in effect, nullifying any potential gain their 
status may hold. Field observations suggest that intermediary agents, for one, tend to 
charge fees where none are applicable (e.g. students, family members etc.), and for the 
other, misguide individuals to apply for standard Schengen visas even in cases where 
entitlement for visa-free travel as service providers would be a given (e.g. business 
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persons, academics). As Egemen Bagis pertinently observed: “Obtaining a visa 
exemption document is harder than obtaining a visa”.82  
Yet another problematique pertains to the issue of multiple travels. Some individuals, 
especially business persons and alike, are of the frequent traveller type. The amount of 
time a visa is issued, however, often only covers one or two specific travels. What is 
more, the purpose of travel needs to documented and proven by the applicant. Some 
national authorities are particularly meticulous on this score. Thus, not only do frequent 
(business) travellers suffer from increased economic costs (as they often need to lodge 
visa applications every single time they travel), but they are also put into a 
disadvantaged position vis-à-vis their (business) counterparts because attaining a visa 
goes by way of obtaining an official invitation from the latter. 
 
Examining Schengen visa-issuing figures yields further insights into the bureaucratic 
dimensions of the securitization of the Turkish visa issue. Figure 10 presents Schengen 
state’s visa rejection rates for Turkish applicants (annual average of 2005-2010). What 
becomes apparent from the figure is that refusal rates exhibited marked variation across 
member states. For the total of Turkish visa applications reached in between 2005 and 
2010, refusal rates were highest in Germany, Austria and Belgium with 16, 19 and 23 
per cent, respectively. It is important to note that these countries were also reported to 
have caused difficulties during the visa-issuing process. On the bottom of the list are 
EU countries such as Hungary, Romania, Greece, Italy and Portugal. These states 
exhibited mean refusal rates which were lower as two per cent for the time period 2005 
to 2010 (see Appendix 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
82 http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=303205 
(Accessed 14 May 2013). 
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Figure 10. Schengen Visa Rejection Rates for Turkish nationals (2005-2010) for 
selected EU member states 
	  
 
Discussion. The preceding analysis has explored real-world implications of the EU’s 
restrictive visa regime towards Turkey by looking at Schengen states’ visa-issuing 
practices. The empirical findings can, by and large, be seen as indicative of the 
bureaucratic securitization of the Turkish visa issue (most notably in Germany, Austria, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands). Most intriguing is that these practices seem to run 
parallel to securitization processes in the political arena (see 5.3.2). One may perhaps 
even speak of a liaison between political and bureaucratic security-framing practices (a 
theme certainly worthwhile probing into in future research). In contrast to political 
security-framing, however, bureaucratic securitizations seem to revolve primarily 
around the application of security and policing logics in the light of the visa issuing 
process. Where this security-logic takes the upper hand, individual visa applicants are 
frequently subjected to in-transparent and arbitrary practices. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis has probed into the modalities of EU external policy-making in Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) by way of examining the differential EU-Turkey readmission-visa 
agreement outcome as compared to analogous agreements the EU concluded with other 
countries in the Balkans such as Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. The inquiry was 
thereby centered around two interrelated research questions: why has the EU withheld 
from Turkey a genuine visa liberalization prospect? And more generally, what are the 
dynamics driving political outcomes in EU external affairs policy making in JHA areas 
such as immigration, visa and border policy? 
Applying a liberal intergovernmentalist lens, which highlights the role of issue-specific 
domestic preference configurations, it has been argued that the differential Turkey-EU 
readmission-visa agreement outcome emanated from adverse domestic sentiments in 
member states such as Germany, France, Austria and the Netherlands.83 In these 
countries, public opinion trumped other domestic interests such as economic 
considerations due to the securitization (triggering mechanism) of the issue of Turkish 
visa liberalization. Portraying Turkish visa exemption as matter implicating the risk of 
massive illegal immigration (i.e. casting it as an existential threat), elites moved the 
issue from low politics into the realm of high politics where sources of domestic 
preference formation other than economic interests were activated (here, public 
sentiment). In Germany, France, Austria and the Netherlands general public sentiment 
on the topic immigration and cross-border mobility was already adverse, and so the 
situation ripe for political entrepreneurs to seize the opportunity by securitizing the 
issue of Turkish visa liberalization as well. 	  
83 Another opposed country was Cyprus. The latter’s opposition, though, derived from 
its generally adversative stance towards Turkey and its EU credentials than 
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On the bargaining level, the reason why member states supportive of Turkey’s visa bid 
such as Italy, Sweden, Finland, Poland and Spain were not able to steer the political 
outcome on the EU level towards their preferred positions lies, on the one hand, in the 
constrained domestic win-sets of the opposed member states (Germany, France, Austria 
and the Netherlands) and, on the other hand, in their claim to possess factual knowledge 
about the socio-political implications of Turkish visa exemption (migratory threat). 
These two factors effectually strengthened the opposed countries’ bargaining hands. 
The circumstance that two large countries (Germany and France84) were amongst the 
latter group further weakened the bargaining power of supportive actors. 
The proposed argument has been tested by employing process-tracing and congruence 
testing methodology through holistic and in-depth case studies. In order to achieve data 
triangulation, diverse empirical sources were drawn upon ranging from official EU 
documents, political leaders’ statements, and personal interviews to statistical data. In 
order to rule out rival accounts, the veracity of an alternative supranational 
institutionalist explanation was assed in a comprehensive analysis along the way. Taken 
together, these measures strengthen confidence in the obtained findings and increase our 
overall inferential leverage. 
What theoretical implications can be drawn out from the findings? On the most general 
level, the results obtained herein buttress a crucial point that has recently been raised in 
the literature: member state preferences are issue-specific and differ across policy 
domains and time (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009). In this vein, a basic theoretical 
proposition about policy-making dynamics in the realm of JHA policies is advanced 
herein: public sentiments trump other interests as a source of governmental preference 
formation in JHA policies such as immigration, border and visa policy where the issue 	  
84 Germany and France constitute key countries because they possess the highest vote 
shares in the European Council (with 29 each) followed by the UK and Italy (29), and 
Spain and Poland (27). Where Qualified Majority Voting is effective, as is the case with 
readmission-visa agreements, this is very central. According to the rules laid out in the 
Treaty of Nice, which was applicable at the time of writing, for a legislative proposal to 
go through the Council it needs the support of: - at least 14 (or 18, if proposal was not 
made by the Commission) countries; - at least 255 of the total 345 voting weights; - at 
least 311 mil. people represented by the states that vote in favor (the latter condition 
need only apply if member states require so in the Council). Germany and France alone 
make up 17 per cent of the votes in the Council and 29.4 per cent of the EU’s 
population. For this reason, and because of their economies’ sizes, Germany and France 
are considered “powerful” countries. 
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at hand is securitized.85 Given the narrower empirical domain of this study (focus on 
Turkey-EU readmission agreement), the proposed hypothesis must naturally be 
conceived of as tentative. The proposition’s analytical veracity across cases would 
certainly be worthwhile assessing in future studies  
What policy implications follow from the findings? Two important themes emerge; one 
concerning Turkey’s membership accession process, and the other Schengen states’ visa 
issuing practices. First, the EU’s differential treatment of Turkey on the visa issue as 
compared to Western Balkan candidate countries is fundamentally unconstructive in 
terms of Turkey’s EU rule adoption process as a whole. Perceived unfair treatment in 
the eyes of Turkish policy makers only further weakens the EU’s credibility vis-à-vis 
Turkey. In the absence of a genuine membership prospect, there are no other substantial 
incentives to encourage continued alignment with EU law (Schimmelfennig &  
Sedelmeier 2004). Turkey has been suffering under these conditions ever since the 
beginning of its EU accession negotiations in 2005. Recurring opposition by key 
member states such as Germany and France, the open-ended nature of the accession 
process as written into the accession negotiations agreement, the Cyprus issue, as well 
as high levels of negative public opinion to Turkish EU membership, to name just a few 
central factors, have undermined the EU’s credibility from the Turkish perspective 
(Yildirim & Baysan 2013, 2). Ergo, slow rule transposition by Turkish policy makers 
can be attributed to the lack of a compensating external reward structure. In such 
contexts - where the EU’s “carrot” is in doubt (which may very well happen in the 
Western Balkans as well in view of the on-going ramifications of the financial crisis and 
an overall feeling of “enlargement fatigue”) - EU authorities need to make better use of 
policy-based intermediate rewards if they wish to see rule adoption continue in target 
countries. Visa facilitation and liberalization agreements constitute very important tools 
in this regard (Trauner 2009). Their potential to revitalize EU rule adoption, in the 
domain of JHA and beyond, ought not to be underestimated. 
Second, the analysis of Schengen states visa issuing practices towards Turkish nationals 
indicates that the latter are far from being harmonized despite regulations put into force 
on the EU level (e.g. Common Consular Instructions, the Schengen Border Handbook, 	  
85 To be sure, given design restrictions, the objective here is primarily to derive 
theoretical abstractions. No statistical generalizations are attempted at. Future research 
should follow up the matter towards deriving statements about the argument’s veracity 
across cases and time. 
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and the Visa Codex). The fact that similar observations have also been made in other 
contexts (for Eastern Europe see Boratyński et al. 2006) further buttresses this point. 
The problem with hitherto devised EU regulations can be said to lie in their 
overemphasis on formal and technical aspects of the visa issuing process. A genuine 
visa harmonisation, however, will require EU policy makers to stipulate precise 
decision-making instructions to which national authorities would have to adhere. As 
things stand, national visa authorities continue to enjoy considerable leeway in going 
about their own national visa issuing policies. This point ties to a more profound 
empirical question also: In view of the fact that policy-making in JHA is governed by 
the community method (that is, qualified majority voting and no member state veto 
right), but the EU-Turkey readmission-visa agreement outcome was so markedly 
shaped by member state concerns, to what extent is then still possible to speak of JHA 
as a genuinely communitarized area, if member states are in the position to decisively 
influence the policy process? 
In sum, while the Turkey-EU readmission-visa agreement may on the surface seem to 
constitute only a minor aspect in Turkey-EU relations, it really bears much broader 
implications as embodied in the discussion above. At a time where domestic support for 
EU membership has hit the bottom among Turkish citizens - with a support rate as low 
as 33 per cent in 2013, as compared to approx. 70 per cent in 200586 - a fair treatment 
by the EU and a credible reward structure seems more important than ever if the EU is 
genuine about Turkey’s membership. A quote that lucidly depicts the importance of the 
visa issue from the Turkish perspective in this respect comes from Egemen Bagis, 
Turkey’s Chief EU negotiator: “the time when Turkish people feel least European is 
when they wait in line for a visa.”87  	  
86EDAM’s study was carried out by TNS Turkey “between 05 December 2012 – 14 
January 2013 in Turkey with the participation of 1509 people representing a cross 
section of the urban and rural population at the age of 18 and above. The cities which 
were included in the survey: Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Bursa, Diyarbakir, Manisa, 
Erzurum, Gaziantep, Istanbul, Izmir, Kayseri, Kirklareli, Konya, Içel, Samsun, 
Zonguldak, Denizli, Malatya. This sampling method makes the EDAM study more 
representative than for instance Eurobarometer surveys. See URL: 
http://edam.org.tr/eng/document/Edam%20Poll%202013-1.pdf (Accessed 30 May 
2013)  
 
87 http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=241626 
(Accessed 13 May 2013) 
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Appendix 1 
 
Turkish Outbound Tourism Figures  
 Destination Visitors  
(in thousand) 
 Destination Visitors  
(in thousand) 
1 Other: West-Asian 
Countries 
958.857 19 Austria 72.423 
2 Bulgaria 672.874 20 Ukraine 68.129 
3 Georgia 582.926 21 United Kingdom 66.769 
4 Syria 473.862 22 Switzerland 40.117 
5 Greece 449.523 23 Belgium 38.783 
6 Azerbaijan 439.074 24 Other: East Asian 
Countries 
31.479 
7 Japan 415.000 25 Netherlands 30.469 
8 Germany 385.477 26 Spain 22.209 
9 Other European 
Countries 
323.985 27 Other: Southeast Asian 
Countries 
18.066 
10 Undefined 306.691 28 Canada 16.989 
11 Iran 260.361 39 Other OECD Countries 
 
15.688 
12 Italy 248.413 30 Australia 12.594 
13 Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
(Former USSR) 
160.465 31 Other: American 
countries 
6.258 
14 USA 157.380 32 Denmark 6.145 
15 Other: South-Asian 
Countries 
124.246 33 Israel 5.099 
16 Russia 120.132 34 Other Countries 2.846 
17 Other: African 
Countries 
116.228 35 Sweden 2.446 
18 France 87.821 36 Tunisia 1.100 
      
    Total 6.326.341 
Data for 2012, by Country/Region of Destination Source: Turkish Statistics Institute 
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Appendix 2 
 
Demographics on Turkish immigrants living in selected EU member states 
 
  Total of Turkish 
Immigrants 
Turkish 
Nationality 
Naturalized 
Germany 2,642 1,912 730 
France 370 196 174 
Netherlands 270 96 174 
Austria 200 120 80 
Belgium 110 67 43 
UK 70 37 33 
Denmark 53 39 14 
Sweden 37 14 23 
(Figures in Thousands). Source: Independent Commission on Turkey (2004)88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
88 http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/2004_english.pdf (Accessed 
20 May 2013) 
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Appendix 3 
 
EU citizens’ attitudes on intra-EU travel without border controls 
 
 
• How important is it to you to be able to travel within the EU without internal 
border controls? - response choices: totally important/ totally 
unimportant/don’t know.  
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Appendix 4 
 
Group-Conflict Hypothesis (Economic Threat Perceptions) Indicators 
 
 
 Immigrants Take Away Jobs (Indicator 1) 
 
 GER AU FI FR PL NL IT ESP SW take  23.5 15.3 10.8 7.6 11.1 5.2 7.5 7.8 5.5 
2 4 10.2 6.4 6.3 5.2 4 4.1 4.7 3.2 
3 14.2 13.7 10.5 10.4 9.3 9.1 5.6 8.8 4.9 
4 6.1 11.2 10.5 13.2 9.6 9.8 5.9 7.6 5.9 
5 21.5 18.4 17.8 17.1 15.6 20.2 22.3 11.9 10.8 
6 4.5 6 11.2 9.2 8.8 11.1 5.4 6.6 5.7 
7 6.4 7.1 9.7 8.5 9.9 16.1 9.3 15 9.2 
8 7.8 10.3 9.3 11 11.2 14.5 14.1 15.1 15.7 
9 2.8 2.3 4.6 5.4 7 4.2 7.9 8.5 12.6 
don’t 9.2 5.6 9.1 11.3 12.3 5.8 18 13.9 26.3 
N 1496 2037 1451 1482 1471 1534 1487 1099 1082 
Source: European Values Study (2008), values in percent 
 
 
Immigrants are a Strain on Welfare System (Indicator 2) 
 
 GER AU FI FR PL NL IT ESP SW are  28.2 35 12.1 13.3 10.5 6.8 12 5.7 11.5 
2 15.6 7.5 7.7 8.1 6.3 7.3 7.4 5 7.8 
3 15.9 16.6 16.5 11.8 11.7 13.4 11.3 9 9.6 
4 10.3 6.5 15.9 9.3 13.5 15.7 9.2 9.5 8.6 
5 12.3 13.4 13.6 22.3 19 17.8 14.8 21.5 11.5 
6 3.3 5.4 8.9 6.2 10.2 11.6 8 11.2 6.2 
7 3.9 3.8 8.6 6.7 7.4 11.1 6.6 10.8 6.5 
8 4.6 3.8 6 7.5 7.3 8 7.1 11.2 10.7 
9 2.1 1.8 2.6 5.1 2.9 1.8 3.5 4.1 7.3 
aren’t 2.3 4.4 4.3 8.4 6.3 3.2 7.6 5.9 10.4 
N= 1510 2075 1501 1134 1519 1187 1510 1554 1500 
Source: European Values Study (2008), values in percent 
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Appendix 5 
 
Symbolic-Politics Hypothesis (Ideational Threat Perceptions) Indicators 
 
 
Immigrants undermine Country's Cultural Life (Indicator 1) 
 
 AU GER FR NL IT ESP PL SW FI undermine  22.2 10.7 8.7 4.4 9.3 6.8 4.7 6.7 5.7 
2 4.6 9.1 5.1 4.8 4.5 4.8 3 6.6 2.9 
3 16.3 12.6 8.7 10.4 9.5 7.1 6.6 6.2 5.6 
4 6.1 11 7.9 12.5 8.1 8.8 8 7.1 4.4 
5 17.6 17.6 17.4 14.5 12.3 14.5 13.5 9 9.3 
6 5.4 7 5.9 9.7 7.9 10.4 9.9 7 6.9 
7 8.3 8.8 7.9 14.9 9.8 12.2 9.6 8 11.2 
8 7.9 13.6 14.1 15.8 13.8 15.1 15.8 14.1 18.1 
9 2.6 2.8 8 5 7.7 8.2 8.8 9.7 11.4 
do not 9.1 6.9 16.3 8 17 12.1 20.1 25.6 24.6 
N 1485 2028 1434 1488 1434 1064 1090 1476 1531 
Source: European Values Study (2008), values in percent 
 
 
Immigrants Living In Your Country: Feels Like A Stranger (Indicator 2) 
 
 AU FR ESP GER NL IT SW FI PL agree strongly 18.8 11.1 6.6 10.3 5.8 8.3 7.1 6.1 3.7 
agree 32.1 19.8 23.1 18.3 21.2 19 16.4 11.4 7.5 
neither  17.7 15.6 13.4 22.1 14.7 19.6 17.6 18.8 16.4 
disagree 17.9 21 42 28.5 41.5 34.7 26.7 34.2 47.4 
disagree 
strongly 13.5 32.5 14.8 20.8 16.8 18.4 32.1 29.5 25.1 
N 1495 1498 2018 1462 1111 1484 1101 1546 1472 
Source: European Values Study (2008), values in percent 
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Appendix 6 
 
Schengen Visa Rejection Rates for Turkish applicants 
 
Country Ankara Istanbul Izmir Mean 
Belgium 27.6 18.9 - 23.3 
Austria* 29.6 7.9 - 18.8 
Germany* 26.1 8.4 12.6 15.7 
Norway 15.6 - - 15.6 
Estonia 14.4 - - 14.4 
Sweden 22.4 4.2 - 13.3 
Malta - 12.3 - 12.3 
Netherlands* 16.1 7.1 - 11.6 
Finland 11.3 - - 11.3 
Latvia 11.0 - - 11.0 
Denmark 14.9 4.5 - 9.7 
France* 15.2 3.9 - 9.6 
Switzerland 11.1 5.8 - 8.5 
Slovenia 6.2 - - 6.2 
Lithuania 5.9 - - 5.9 
Bulgaria 5.1 5.6 - 5.4 
Poland 5.8 3.9 - 4.8 
Slovakia 5.8 3.0 - 4.4 
Spain 6.4 2.2 - 4.3 
Czech Republic 6.7 1.8 - 4.3 
Hungary 2.2 1.3 - 1.8 
Romania 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.5 
Greece 1.3 0.7 2.2 1.4 
Italy 0.4 0.9 1.7 1.0 
Portugal 
 
1.8 
 
0.0 
 
- 
 
0.9 
 
 
Mean 10.9 4.9 4.8 8.7 
Adapted from European Visa Database (Hobolth 2012), by Schengen country and consulate 
(Mean values in per cent for the period 2005-2010) 
Note: *Schengen States opposing Visa-Liberalization for Turkey 
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